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Informational Equilibrium

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  • Riley, John G

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  • Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:47:y:1979:i:2:p:331-59
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
    2. Layard, Richard & Psacharopoulos, George, 1974. "The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 985-998, Sept./Oct.
    3. Charles Wilson, 1976. "A Model of Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 432, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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