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References listed on IDEAS
- Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 174-186.
- Charles Wilson, 1976. "A Model of Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 432, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- John G. Riley, 1974. "Competitive Signalling," UCLA Economics Working Papers 050, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Layard, Richard & Psacharopoulos, George, 1974. "The Screening Hypothesis and the Returns to Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 985-998, Sept./Oct.
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