Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718972
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- Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
Citations
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Cited by:
- B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
- Goulão, Catarina, 2014. "Voluntary Public Health Insurance," TSE Working Papers 14-488, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Georges Dionne, 1981.
"Le risque moral et la sélection adverse : une revue critique de la littérature,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 57(2), pages 193-224.
- Dionne, G., 1980. "Le Risque Moral et la Selection Adverse: une Revue Critique de la Litterature," Cahiers de recherche 8006, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Daniel L. McFadden & Carlos E. Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012.
"Remedies for Sick Insurance,"
NBER Working Papers
17938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 302, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Catarina Goulão, 2015. "Voluntary public health insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 135-157, January.
- Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Casey Rothschild & Paul D. Thistle, 2022. "Supply, demand, and selection in insurance markets: Theory and applications in pictures," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 419-444, December.
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