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Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison

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  • Hansen, Bodil O.
  • Keiding, Hans

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  • Hansen, Bodil O. & Keiding, Hans, 2002. "Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 739-756, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:21:y:2002:i:5:p:739-756
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, Peter, 1992. "Organizing the Health Insurance Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1233-1254, November.
    2. Georges Dionne & Pierre Lasserre, 1985. "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 719-723.
    3. G. Dionne & N. Doherty & N. Fombaron, 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," THEMA Working Papers 2000-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    4. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    6. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
    7. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    8. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    9. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    10. William Johnson, 1977. "Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 23-35, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoel, Michael, 2007. "What should (public) health insurance cover?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 251-262, March.
    2. Marisol Rodríguez & Alexandrina Stoyanova, 2006. "Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives," Working Papers CREAP2006-12, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Dec 2006.
    3. Jihong Ding & Minglai Zhu, 2009. "A theoretical investigation of the reformed public health insurance in urban China," Frontiers of Economics in China, Springer;Higher Education Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1-29, March.
    4. Alessandro Petretto, 2013. "On the Fuzzy Boundaries between Public and Private in Health-Care Organization and Funding Systems," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 1, pages 327-370, January-M.
    5. Peilu Zhang & Marco A. Palma, 2021. "Compulsory Versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(1), pages 106-125, January.
    6. Nathalie Fombaron & Carine Milcent, 2007. "The distortionary effect of health insurance on health demand," Working Papers halshs-00587713, HAL.
    7. Ellert, Alexander & Urmann, Oliver, 2012. "Competition in the market for supplementary health insurance: The case of competing nonprofit sickness funds," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 25 [rev.], University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    8. Omar Paccagnella & Vincenzo Rebba & Guglielmo Weber, 2013. "VOLUNTARY PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE AMONG THE OVER 50s IN EUROPE," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 289-315, March.
    9. Marisol Rodríguez & Alexandrina Stoyanova, 2008. "Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 185-202, February.

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