Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. "Competitive" equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.
Volume (Year): 88 (1974)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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