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Compulsory versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment

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  • Zhang, Peilu
  • Palma, Marco A

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  • Zhang, Peilu & Palma, Marco A, 2018. "Compulsory versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment," 2018 Annual Meeting, February 2-6, 2018, Jacksonville, Florida 266654, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:saea18:266654
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    11. Paolo Crosetto & Antonio Filippin, 2013. "The “bomb” risk elicitation task," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 31-65, August.
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    14. Ruth Hill & Angelino Viceisza, 2012. "A field experiment on the impact of weather shocks and insurance on risky investment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(2), pages 341-371, June.
    15. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    16. John K. Horowitz & Erik Lichtenberg, 1993. "Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use in Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(4), pages 926-935.
    17. Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, 2008. "The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1083-1102, June.
    18. Ann-Renée Blais & Elke U. Weber, 2006. "A Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale for adult populations," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 1, pages 33-47, July.
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    24. Berger, Lawrence A & Hershey, John C, 1994. "Moral Hazard, Risk Seeking, and Free Riding," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 173-186, October.
    25. Dean Karlan & Ed Kutsoati & Margaret McMillan & Chris Udry, 2011. "Crop Price Indemnified Loans for Farmers: A Pilot Experiment in Rural Ghana," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 37-55, March.
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    28. Alma Cohen, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 197-207, May.
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    30. Sapelli, Claudio & Vial, Bernardita, 2003. "Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 459-476, May.
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