IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ioe/doctra/195.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Claudio Sapelli

    () (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

  • Bernardita Vial

    () (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

Abstract

In Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio Sapelli & Bernardita Vial, 2001. "Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 195, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:195
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/dt_195.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Claudio Sapelli & Bernardita Vial, 1998. "Utilización de Prestaciones de Salud en Chile: ¿Es Diferente entre Grupos de Ingreso?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 35(106), pages 343-382.
    2. William H. Greene, 1997. "FIML Estimation of Sample Selection Models for Count Data," Working Papers 97-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    3. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Chapters,in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1, pages 1-32 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Cameron, A. Colin & Trivedi, Pravin K., 1991. "The role of income and health risk in the choice of health insurance : Evidence from Australia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-28, June.
    5. Claudio Sapelli & Arístides Torche, 1998. "El Seguro Previsional de Salud: Determinantes de la Elección entre Seguro Público y Privado, 1990-1994," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 35(106), pages 383-406.
    6. David Cutler, 1994. "Market Failure in Small Group Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 4879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. A. C. Cameron & P. K. Trivedi & Frank Milne & J. Piggott, 1988. "A Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in Australia," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 85-106.
    8. David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, 1998. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-Off between Competition and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(2), pages 433-466.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insurance; moral hazard; adverse selection; self selection; count data models;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:195. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jaime Casassus). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iepuccl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.