Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance
In Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Publication status:||Published as "Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance", Journal of Health Economics, Volume 22, Issue 3, May 2003, pp. 459-476.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Avda. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago|
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Web page: http://www.economia.uc.cl
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