Selection Stories: Understanding Movement across Health Plans
This study assesses the factors influencing the movement of people across health plans. We distinguish three types of cost-related transitions: adverse selection, the movement of the less healthy to more generous plans; adverse retention, the tendency for people to stay where they are when they get sick; and aging in place, where lack of all movement makes plans with initially older enrollees increase in cost over time. Using data from the Group Insurance Commission in Massachusetts, we show that aging in place and adverse selection are both quantitatively important. Each can materially impact equilibrium enrollments, especially when premiums to enrollees reflect these costs.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138|
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"Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice,"
07-047, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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"Adverse Selection in Health Insurance,"
Forum for Health Economics & Policy,
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NBER Working Papers
7176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Journal of Health Economics,
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- Altman, Daniel & Cutler, David & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2003. "Enrollee Mix, Treatment Intensity, and Cost in Competing Indemnity and HMO Plans," Scholarly Articles 2664300, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Daniel Altman & David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, 2000. "Enrollee Mix, Treatment Intensity, and Cost in Competing Indemnity and HMO Plans," NBER Working Papers 7832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McClellan, Mark & Cutler, David & Newhous, Joseph P., 2000. "How Does Managed Care Do It?," Scholarly Articles 2643884, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Anne Beeson Royalty & Neil Solomon, 1999. "Health Plan Choice: Price Elasticities in a Managed Competition Setting," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-41.
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