Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
Individual choice among health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals' being allocated to the wrong plans; risk-sharing losses, because premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers' distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a signiacant concern. Harvards decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within three years. The Group Insurance Commission has contained adverse selection by subsidizing premiums proportionally and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high-cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.
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Volume (Year): 1 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David M. Cutler & Sarah Reber, 1996. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 5796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hill, Steven C. & Wolfe, Barbara L., 1997. "Testing the HMO competitive strategy: An analysis of its impact on medical care resources," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 261-286, June.
- David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1997.
"Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms,"
NBER Working Papers
5913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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