Separating Selection and Incentive Effects in Health Insurance
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- Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2005. "Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance," Working Papers halshs-00590713, HAL.
- Lucien Gardiol & Pierre-Yves Geoffard & Chantal Grandchamp, 2005. "Separating selection and incentive effects in health insurance," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590713, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsadverse selection; demand for health care; full maximum likelihood estimation; health insurance; moral hazard;
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
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