Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control
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- Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2011. "Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 1-13.
- Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2007. "Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control," IZA Discussion Papers 3143, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Guido Friebel & Wendelin Schnedler, 2011. "Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control," Post-Print hal-00978261, HAL.
- Guido Friebel & Wendelin Schnedler, 2007. "Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control," Working Papers 0457, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2007.
- Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2007. "Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 6575, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2007. "Team Governance: Empowerment of Hierarchical Control," IDEI Working Papers 520, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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More about this item
Keywords
Team work Incentives Informed principal Intrinsic motivation;JEL classification:
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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