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Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

Author

Listed:
  • Bauer, Kevin
  • Kosfeld, Michael
  • von Siemens, Ferdinand A.

Abstract

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce “social” goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results show that social-good production more than doubles if incentives are low, but only if self-selection is possible. The analysis identifies a crucial role of incentives in the matching and coordination of motivated agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Bauer, Kevin & Kosfeld, Michael & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2025. "Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 276-292.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:152:y:2025:i:c:p:276-292
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.010
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intrinsic motivation; Self-selection; Incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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