The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World
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References listed on IDEAS
- Eaton, Curtis & White, William D, 1983. "The Economy of High Wages: An Agency Problem," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(198), pages 175-181, May.
- Wessels, Walter J, 1980. "The Effect of Minimum Wages in the Presence of Fringe Benefits: An Expanded Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 293-313, April.
- Barry Nalebuff & David Scharfstein, 1987. "Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 265-277.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
- George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
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