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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

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  • Margaretha Buurman
  • Robert Dur

Abstract

Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay-for-performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but necessitates an increase in expected wage compensation, which can result in sorting from both the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also show how client composition affects sorting and why street-level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.
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Suggested Citation

  • Margaretha Buurman & Robert Dur, 2012. "Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(4), pages 1318-1345, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:114:y:2012:i:4:p:1318-1345
    DOI: j.1467-9442.2012.01723.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Dur & Robin Zoutenbier, 2011. "Working for a Good Cause," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-168/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 23 Apr 2013.
    2. Jean-Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Boyer, 2013. "Welfare programs and motivation bias of social workers," 2013 Meeting Papers 617, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Ida Lindkvist, 2013. "Informal Payments And Health Worker Effort: A Quantitative Study From Tanzania," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(10), pages 1250-1271, October.
    4. Galina Besstremyannaya & Sergei Golovan, 2019. "Physician’s altruism in incentive contracts: Medicare’s quality race," CINCH Working Paper Series 1903, Universitaet Duisburg-Essen, Competent in Competition and Health.
    5. Hoffmann, Lisa, 2023. "(Ch)eating for oneself or cheating for others? Experimental evidence from young politicians and students in Kenya," OSF Preprints xnez5, Center for Open Science.
    6. Bauer, Kevin & Kosfeld, Michael & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2025. "Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 276-292.
    7. repec:osf:osfxxx:xnez5_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Francisco Candel‐Sánchez & Juan Perote‐Peña, 2020. "Optimal Incentives on Multiple Prosocial Activities when Reputation Matters," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 1207-1230, July.
    9. Robert Dur & Robin Zoutenbier, 2015. "Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 16(3), pages 343-366, August.
    10. Rhea Molato, 2015. "Public-Private Wage Differentials and the Quality of Government Workers in the Philippines," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2015-06, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    11. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2018. "Prosocial Motivation and Incentives," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 10(1), pages 411-438, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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