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Altruism and Burnout: Long Hours in the Teaching Profession

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  • Dora Gicheva

Abstract

This article explores why many public school teachers work substantially more hours than required by contract, given that the elasticity of their earnings with respect to their hours is close to zero. The author introduces a theoretical framework for public-sector employees in which high levels of effort can indicate either altruism (for intrinsically motivated employees) or low productivity (for low-ability employees). Because intrinsically motivated employees derive higher utility from working in the public sector, they are less likely to exit it. Over time, selection makes high levels of effort more strongly predictive of altruism than of low ability. Findings show that teachers with very low levels of experience exhibit little or no relationship between weekly hours and the probability of remaining in teaching. This correlation becomes more positive as teaching experience increases. Similarly, the level of work hours is positively related to self-reported burnout at low levels of experience, but the relationship is reversed for teachers who have been in the profession longer.

Suggested Citation

  • Dora Gicheva, 2022. "Altruism and Burnout: Long Hours in the Teaching Profession," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 75(2), pages 427-457, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:75:y:2022:i:2:p:427-457
    DOI: 10.1177/0019793920981055
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    intrinsic motivation; working hours; teachers; public-sector labor markets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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