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Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England

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  • Adele Atkinson
  • Simon Burgess
  • Bronwyn Croxson
  • Paul Gregg

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of a performance-related pay scheme for teachers in England. Using teacher level data, matched with test scores and value-added, we test whether the introduction of a payment scheme based on pupil attainment increased teacher effort. Our evaluation design controls for pupil effects, school effects and teacher effects, and adopts a difference-in-difference methodology. We find that the scheme did improve test scores and value added, on average by about half a grade per pupil. We also find heterogeneity across subjects, with maths teachers showing no improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Adele Atkinson & Simon Burgess & Bronwyn Croxson & Paul Gregg, 2004. "Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/113, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:04/113
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives; teachers pay; education reform; pupil attainment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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