The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia
This paper investigates whether the widespread awarding of faculty merit pay at a large public university accurately reflects productivity. We show that pairwise voting on a quality standard by a committee can in theory be consistent with observed allocation patterns. However, the data indicate only nominal adherence to a quality standard. Departments with more severe compression issues are more likely to award merit pay as a countermeasure and some departments appear to be motivated by nonpecuniary incentives. Much of the variance in merit pay allocation remains unexplained. These results suggest reform is needed to improve transparency in the merit system.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2010|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Towson, Maryland 21252-0001|
Web page: http://www.towson.edu/cbe/departments/economics/
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LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
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