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Performance pay for teachers: Determinants and consequences

  • Belfield, Clive R.
  • Heywood, John S.

Theory and evidence on performance-related pay for teaching remain inconclusive. Teachers will respond to rewards, but an appropriate reward structure may not be devised because education is a collaborative endeavor. Here we test three hypotheses: performance-related pay among teachers is more likely to be observed when there are evident indicators of team production; teachers receiving performance pay will earn more in total than otherwise equal teachers without performance pay; and teachers receiving performance pay should have higher job satisfaction. We use the Schools and Staffing Survey (2000) to test each hypothesis. Team production does strongly predict performance-related pay, and that such pay does boost earnings, but that job satisfaction is lower for those who receive such pay awards.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics of Education Review.

Volume (Year): 27 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 243-252

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:27:y:2008:i:3:p:243-252
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  1. Goldin, Claudia, 1986. "Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: A Historical Analysis," Scholarly Articles 2666727, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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  4. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2002. "Payment Schemes and Gender in Germany," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 44-64, October.
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  8. Sarah Brown & John G. Sessions, 2003. "Attitudes, Expectations and Sharing," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 17(4), pages 543-569, December.
  9. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534, 04.
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  11. Booth, Alison L & Frank, Jeff, 1999. "Earnings, Productivity, and Performance-Related Pay," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(3), pages 447-63, July.
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