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Collectivism versus individualism: performance-related pay and union coverage for non-standard workers in Britain

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  • Francesconi, Marco
  • L. Booth, Alison

Abstract

This paper documents the extent of union coverage and performance-related pay (PRP) - the latter representing one aspect of pay flexibility - across standard and non-standard workers in Britain, using the first seven waves of the British Household Panel Survey, 1991-1997. We find there is no evidence of expansion of either union coverage or PRP towards any type of non-standard employment in the 1990s. Thus union rhetoric about a 'strategy of enlargement' towards non-standard workers remains just that. The only trend over time that we do observe is a continued small decline in union coverage for all male workers (but not for women) and a continued very small growth in PRP coverage for all women (but not for men). In addition, while we find large gender differences in union coverage across non-standard workers, there are only negligible gender differences in PRP incidence. Moreover, the relationship between non-standard employment and PRP is typically weak for both men and women. We also find significant occupational and sectoral differences in union coverage and PRP incidence across non-standard workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesconi, Marco & L. Booth, Alison, 2000. "Collectivism versus individualism: performance-related pay and union coverage for non-standard workers in Britain," ISER Working Paper Series 2000-35, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:ese:iserwp:2000-35
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Drinkwater & Peter Ingram, 2005. "Have Industrial Relations in the UK Really Improved?," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 19(2), pages 373-398, June.
    2. Erling Barth & Bernt Bratsberg & Torbjørn Hægeland & Oddbjørn Raaum, 2008. "Performance Pay and Within-Firm Wage Inequality," Discussion Papers 535, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    3. Béjaoui, Ali & Montmarquette, Claude, 2009. "Rémunération àl’ancienneté et ajustement du marché du travail (Seniority-based Pay and Labour Market Adjustment)," CLSSRN working papers clsrn_admin-2009-23, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 13 Mar 2009.

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