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The Diffusion of Pay for Performance across Occupations

Author

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  • Alberto Bayo-Moriones
  • Jose Enrique Galdon-Sanchez
  • Sara Martinez-De-Morentin

Abstract

The authors analyze the differences in the incidence of pay-for-performance plans across occupations in a sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments. Results show that significant differences occur across occupations in the incidence of individual, group, and firm- or plant-level pay for performance plans. They also examine the roles of establishment size, multinational ownership, and the human resource department in the incidence of pay-for-performance plans and their variability across occupations within the same firm. These factors are correlated with a greater use of pay for performance and, in most cases, this effect is similar across occupations.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Jose Enrique Galdon-Sanchez & Sara Martinez-De-Morentin, 2013. "The Diffusion of Pay for Performance across Occupations," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(5), pages 1115-1148, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:66:y:2013:i:5:p:1115-1148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bayo-Moriones, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Gil, Ricard, 2013. "'Make-or-Buy' of Peripheral Services in Manufacturing: Evidence from Spanish Plant-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 7138, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    2. Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Gil, Ricard & Bayo-Moriones, Alberto, 2015. "Outsourcing of peripheral services: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing plant-level data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 328-344.
    3. Verena Dill & Uwe Jirjahn, 2014. "Foreign Owners and Perceived Job Insecurity in Germany: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data," Research Papers in Economics 2014-09, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    4. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez & Sara Martinez-de-Morentin, 2017. "Performance Measurement and Incentive Intensity," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 496-546, December.
    5. Sly, Nicholas, 2010. "Skill Acquisition, Incentive Contracts and Jobs: Labor Market Adjustment to Trade," MPRA Paper 25004, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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