Incentive Pay Systems and the Management of Human Resources in France and Great Britain
Incentive pay systems have undergone major changes in recent decades. This paper investigates use of incentive pay systems in British and French private sector establishments in 2004, focusing on payment-by-results, merit pay, and profit sharing, using British and French workplace surveys: WERS and Réponse. Despite the stereotypes of Britain as a deregulated economy and France as a more coordinated social-market economy, French firms make considerably greater use of incentive pay, and particularly, merit pay. The paper explores the organisational and institutional determinants of this. It finds that personnel economics and management theories explain a significant share of the within country variation in use of incentive pay systems.
|Date of creation:||May 2007|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992.
"Peer Pressure and Partnerships,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
- Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)