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Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain

  • Richard Belfield
  • David Marsden

Using data from large-scale establishment surveys in Britain and France, we show that incentive pay for non-managers is more widespread in France than in Britain. We explain this finding in terms of the 'beneficial constraint' arising from stronger employment protection in France, which provides an impulse to develop incentive pay; employer networking activities in France, which facilitate joint learning about its development and operation; and government fiscal incentives for profit-sharing, which reduces the cost of its operation.

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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0941.

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Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0941
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

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  1. Alex Bryson & Richard Freeman, 2008. "How Does Shared Capitalism Affect Economic Performance in the UK?," NBER Working Papers 14235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Finegold, David, 1999. "Creating Self-Sustaining, High-Skill Ecosystems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 60-81, Spring.
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  10. Christopher L. Erickson & Sanford M. Jacoby, 2003. "The effect of employer networks on workplace innovation and training," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(2), pages 203-223, January.
  11. Gregg, P. A. & Machin, S. J., 1988. "Unions and the incidence of performance linked pay schemes in Britain," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 91-107, March.
  12. Joseph Lanfranchi & John Treble, 2010. "Just-In-Time Production, Work Organization And Absence Control," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 78(5), pages 460-483, 09.
  13. Dale Belman & Robert Drago & Mark Wooden, 1992. "Workgroups, Efficiency Wages and Work Effort," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 14(4), pages 497-521, July.
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  15. Blanchflower, David G. & Bryson, Alex & Forth, John, 2006. "Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain, 1980-2004," IZA Discussion Papers 2518, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  17. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, 1998. "The Last American Shoe Manufacturers: Changing the Method of Pay to Survive Foreign Competition," NBER Working Papers 6750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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