The Choice of Payment Schemes: Australian Establishment Data
This paper estimates the determinants of incentive schemes. Using Australian data, we analyze a relatively large variety of incentive systems (i.e., individual piece rates, workgroup performance bonuses, workplace level systems and profit sharing) using both the new economics of personnel and the literature on strategic choice to generate hypotheses. We find that monitoring issues, job security, product market competition, and the industrial relations climate rank among the most crucial determinants of incentive use, though this pattern varies across incentive schemes.
|Date of creation:||02 Feb 1994|
|Date of revision:||04 Feb 1994|
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