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Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract

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  • W. Bentley MacLeod
  • Daniel Parent

Abstract

This paper discusses some recent evidence exploring job characteristics and labor market conditions upon contract form. We find that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in observed employment contracts in the US, some of which may be explained by firms Nous analysons, dans cet article, le lien empirique entre les caractéristiques des emplois ainsi que les conditions macroéconomiques locales et la forme que prennent les contrats de travail. Nous observons qu'il y a une grande variété dans la forme des contrats régissant la relation d'emploi et que certains de ces contrats peuvent être expliqués par le fait que les firmes ajustent la façon de compenser leurs travailleurs aux caractéristiques des emplois. Nous trouvons également que l'utilisation de bonis est plus probable lorsque le marché local du travail est caractérisé par un faible taux de chômage. De plus, il est montré que la fréquence d'utilisation de bonis par les firmes américaines a augmenté au cours des 15 dernières années.

Suggested Citation

  • W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-37, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:98s-37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-293, March.
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    6. Charles Brown, 1990. "Firms' Choice of Method of Pay," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 165-1-182-, April.
    7. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1998. "Job Characteristics and the Form of Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-08, CIRANO.
    8. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anders Frederiksen & Elod Takats, 2005. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 881, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2004. "Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 453-474, October.
    3. Garen, John, 2006. "Use of employees and alternative work arrangements in the United States: a law, economics, and organizations perspective," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 107-141, February.
    4. Boyer, M. & Jacques, A. & Moreaux, M., 1998. "Better Observability Promotes the Adoption of more Flexible Technologies," Papers 98.505, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    5. Daniel Parent, 2001. "Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-04, CIRANO.
    6. Jérôme Foulon & Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, 1999. "Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or (and?) Information," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-11, CIRANO.
    7. Anders Frederiksen & Elod Takats, 2005. "Layoffs as Part of an Optimal Incentive Mix: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 881, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    8. Carstensen, Vivian, 2002. "The From-Tayloristic-to-Holistic-Organization Model From an Empirical Perspective," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-256, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    9. Alexopoulos, Michelle, 2007. "A monetary business cycle model with unemployment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3904-3940, December.
    10. Suvorov, Anton & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2009. "Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 665-681, November.

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    Keywords

    Agency models; incomplete contracts; incentive pay; Modèles d'agence; contrats incomplets; réminération incitative;

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