Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract
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- W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1999. "Job characteristics, wages, and the employment contract," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 13-27.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsAgency models; incomplete contracts; incentive pay; Modèles d'agence; contrats incomplets; réminération incitative;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-01-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-LTV-1999-01-11 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-MIC-1999-01-11 (Microeconomics)
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