On the Elasticity of Effort for Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry
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- Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce S., 1997. "On the Elasticity of Effort for Piece Rates: Evidence from the British Columbia Tree-Planting Industry," Cahiers de recherche 9713, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
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More about this item
Keywords
Compensation Systems; Incentive Effect; Principal-Agent Models; Systèmes de compensation; effet incitatif; modèles principal-agent;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
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