Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects : Statistical Evidence From Payroll Records
We estimate the gain in productivity that is realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages; i.e., the incentive effect.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREEN, DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.|
Phone: (418) 656-2096
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Web page: http://www.green.ecn.ulaval.ca/
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, .
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers
15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Christopher Ferrall & Bruce Shearer, 1994.
"Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs, and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records,"
908, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Christopher Ferrall & Bruce S. Shearer, 1994. "Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-12, CIRANO.
- FERRALL, Christopher & SHEARER, Bruce, 1994. "Incentives, Team Production, Transactions Costs, and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records," Cahiers de recherche 9416, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Charles Brown, 1990.
"Firms' choice of method of pay,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 165-182, February.
- Edward P. Lazear, 2000.
"Performance Pay and Productivity,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
- Jones, Derek C & Kato, Takao, 1995. "The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 391-414, June.
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