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Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: A Historical Analysis

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  • Goldin, Claudia

Abstract

Female manufacturing workers around 1900 were far more likely to be paid by the piece and were rarely employed at the same occupation in the same firm as males. These and related aspects of work organization can be understood through a model in which workers shirk, monitoring is costly, and males and females have different turnover rates. Employers adopt either piece rates or deferred payment. Occupational segregation by sex and differences in earnings result even if workers are equally productive. Establishment-level data on supervising male and female workers in time- and piece-rate positions are examined.

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  • Goldin, Claudia, 1986. "Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: A Historical Analysis," Scholarly Articles 2666727, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:2666727
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
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    7. Joanne Salop & Steven Salop, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 619-627.
    8. Guasch, J Luis & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Self-Selection in the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 275-284, June.
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