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Economic models of employee motivation

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  • Joseph A. Ritter
  • Lowell J. Taylor

Abstract

Workers present employers with a range of tricky problems. They can be crooked, subversive, surly, or indolent, even if they are paid on time. Joseph A. Ritter and Lowell J. Taylor explore economists' main theories of how compensation is used to address employee motivation and how these models help to explain puzzling features of labor market. Although these theories are often regarded as competitors, the authors treat them as complementary tools in understanding how employers deal with the complex problem of motivating workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:1997:i:sep:p:3-21
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    Cited by:

    1. W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 1999. "Job characteristics, wages, and the employment contract," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 13-27.
    2. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2001. "Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 75-102, January.
    3. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2008. "Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1876-1891, October.
    4. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2007. "Crime and the Labor Market in a Search Model with Pairwise-Efficient Separations," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt72r6g75d, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

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