IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlabec/v13y1995i4p678-708.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Efficiency Wages and Employment Rents: The Employer-Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers

Author

Listed:
  • Rebitzer, James B
  • Taylor, Lowell J

Abstract

The 'efficiency wage hypothesis' offers an explanation for employment rents. According to this hypothesis, firms pay wages above the opportunity cost of labor to elicit productivity or quality-enhancing behaviors from employees. Firms pursue this strategy when alternative incentive schemes are unavailable or too costly. Thus, firms will not pay premium wages when employees post sufficiently large performance bonds. This article examines employment rents in a setting where employees post sizable performance bonds--large law firms. Contrary to the efficiency wage hypothesis, the authors find that associates in these large firms post substantial performance bonds while also receiving substantial, ex ante rents. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Efficiency Wages and Employment Rents: The Employer-Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(4), pages 678-708, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:13:y:1995:i:4:p:678-708
    DOI: 10.1086/298389
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/298389
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE for details.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/298389?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence F. Katz, 1986. "Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 235-290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bowles, Samuel, 1985. "The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 16-36, March.
    3. Brown, Charles & Medoff, James, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1027-1059, October.
    4. Oliver E. Williamson, 1967. "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 123-123.
    5. Levine, David I, 1992. "Can Wage Increases Pay for Themselves? Tests with a Production Function," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1102-1115, September.
    6. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
    7. Mellow, Wesley, 1982. "Employer Size and Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(3), pages 495-501, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 201-229.
    2. Pull, Kerstin, 1999. "What is the fair wage? A model of as-if-co-operation," Quint-Essenzen 58, University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community (IAAEG).
    3. Volker Mahnke, 2001. "The Process of Vertical Dis-Integration: An Evolutionary Perspective on Outsourcing," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 5(3), pages 353-379, September.
    4. Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21.
    6. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2011. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 655-688.
    7. Adam Seth Litwin & Phillip H. Phan, 2013. "Quality over Quantity: Reexamining the Link between Entrepreneurship and Job Creation," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(4), pages 833-873, July.
    8. Boylan, Richard T & Long, Cheryl X, 2005. "Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 627-651, October.
    9. Ann Bartel & Brianna Cardiff-Hicks & Kathryn Shaw, 2013. "Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm," NBER Working Papers 19412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    11. Clive Belfield & Xiangdong Wei, 2004. "Employer size-wage effects: evidence from matched employer-employee survey data in the UK," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(3), pages 185-193.
    12. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2024. "Prestige, promotion, and pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118369, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    15. McNabb, Robert & Wass, Victoria, 2006. "Male-female earnings differentials among lawyers in Britain: a legacy of the law or a current practice?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 219-235, April.
    16. Goerke, Laszlo, 1997. "Taxes in an efficiency wage economy," Discussion Papers, Series II 335, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    17. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2373-2437 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Michael, Bryane & Falzon, Joseph & Shamdasani, Ajay, 2015. "A Theory of Financial Services Competition, Compliance and Regulation," EconStor Preprints 107400, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    19. Yair Listokin, 2005. "Future‐Oriented Gang Members?," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(4), pages 1073-1083, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francis Teal & Måns Söderbom, 2002. "Does firm size really affect earnings?," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2002-08, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Bhalotra, Sonia., 2003. "The impact of economic liberalization on employment and wages in India," ILO Working Papers 993650543402676, International Labour Organization.
    3. Cheng, Chen, 2011. "Information, incentives and multinational firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 147-158, September.
    4. Måns Söderbom & Francis Teal & Anthony Wambugu, 2002. "Does firm size really affect earnings?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2002-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    5. repec:ilo:ilowps:365054 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Feng, Shuaizhang, 2009. "Return to Training and Establishment Size: A Reexamination of the Size-Wage Puzzle," IZA Discussion Papers 4143, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Mark Wooden, 2001. "Union Wage Effects in the Presence of Enterprise Bargaining," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 77(236), pages 1-18, March.
    8. Müller, Bettina, 2008. "Matching of Individuals for Start-Ups: A Test of the O-Ring Theory," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-112, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Rebitzer, James B & Robinson, Michael D, 1991. "Employer Size and Dual Labor Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(4), pages 710-715, November.
    10. Binnur Balkan & Semih Tumen, 2016. "Firm-Size Wage Gaps along the Formal-Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 235-266, April.
    11. McGuckin, Robert H. & Nguyen, Sang V., 2001. "The impact of ownership changes: a view from labor markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 739-762, April.
    12. Giulio Bottazzi & Marco Grazzi, 2014. "Dynamics Of Productivity And Cost Of Labour In Italian Manufacturing Firms," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(S1), pages 55-73, December.
    13. Cindy Zoghi, 2010. "Measuring Labor Composition: A Comparison of Alternate Methodologies," NBER Chapters, in: Labor in the New Economy, pages 457-485, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Alan B. Krueger, 1988. "Are Public Sector Workers Paid More Than Their Alternative Wage? Evidence from Longitudinal Data and Job Queues," NBER Chapters, in: When Public Sector Workers Unionize, pages 217-242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Lane, Julia I. & Salmon, Laurie A. & Spletzer, James R., 2007. "Establishment Wage Differentials," Working Papers 403, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
    16. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    17. Giulio Palermo, 2005. "Misconceptions of Power: From Alchian and Demsetz to Bowles and Gintis," Working Papers ubs0510, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    18. Thomas Zimmerfaust, 2018. "Are Workers Willing To Pay To Join A Better Team?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1278-1295, April.
    19. Thierry Lallemand & Robert Plasman & François Rycx, 2007. "The establishment-size wage premium: evidence from European countries," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 34(5), pages 427-451, December.
    20. Lokshin, Boris & Mohnen, Pierre, 2008. "Wage effects of R&D tax incentives:Evidence from the Netherlands," MERIT Working Papers 2008-034, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    21. Ellingsen, Tore & Rosen, Åsa, 1994. "Skill or Luck? Search Frictions and Wage Differentials," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 1, Stockholm School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:13:y:1995:i:4:p:678-708. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.