Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Guillaume ROCHETEAU, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment and Wage Formation with Matching Frictions and Worker Moral Hazard," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1999. "Unemployment Responses to 'Skill-Biased' Technology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 242-265, April.
- Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21.
- Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999.
"New developments in models of search in the labor market,"
Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627
- Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher, 1999. "New Developments in Models of Search in the Labour Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2053, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1998.
"Motivation and Markets,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 388-411, June.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson, 1997. "Motivation and Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 339., Boston College Department of Economics.
- MacLeod, W.B. & Malcomson, J.M., 1997. "Motivation and markets," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9720, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2002.
"Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 387-425, June.
- Guillaume ROCHETEAU, 2000. "Working Time Regulation in a Search Economy with Worker Moral Hazard," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.06, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Alan Manning & J Thomas, 1997. "A Simple Test of the Shirking Model," CEP Discussion Papers dp0374, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J., 1991.
"Interactions between the efficiency wage and insider-outsider theories,"
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 193-196, October.
- Lindbeck, A. & Snower, D.J., 1990. "Interactions between the Efficiency Wage and Insider- Outsider Theories," Papers 474, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Lindbeck, Assar, 1992. "Macroeconomic theory and the labor market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 209-235, April.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2011.
"Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 733-761.
- Espen R. Moen & A Rosen, 2007. "Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium," CEP Discussion Papers dp0832, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Moen, Espen R. & Rosen, Asa, 2007. "Incentives in competitive search equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19663, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2008:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eguchi, Kyota, 2014. "Employment protection and incentives: Severance pay vs. procedural inconvenience," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 272-290.
- Moen, Espen R & Rosén, Åsa, 2006. "Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium and Wage Rigidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 5554, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- James Costain & Marcel Jansen, 2010.
"Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(4), pages 782-811, December.
- James Costain & Marcel Jansen, 2006. "Employment fluctuations with downward wage rigidity: the role of moral hazard," Working Papers 0632, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Costain, James & Jansen, Marcel, 2009. "Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity: The Role of Moral Hazard," IZA Discussion Papers 4344, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Norikazu Tawara, 2008. "No-shirking Conditions in Frictional Labor Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10.
- Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2015. "Equilibrium matching and termination," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 208-229.
- Sinko, Pekka, 2002. "Labour Taxation, Tax Progression and Job Matching - Comparative Alternative Models of Wage Setting," Discussion Papers 285, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Shin, Jong Kook & Subramanian, Chetan, 2014. "Disinflation with labor market frictions," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-15.
- Longhi, Simonetta & Nijkamp, Peter & Reggiani, Aura & Blien, Uwe, 2002. "Forecasting regional labour markets in Germany: an evaluation of the performance of neural network analysis," ERSA conference papers ersa02p117, European Regional Science Association.
More about this item
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:8:y:2001:i:1:p:75-102. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.