Morale, Relationships, and Wages: An Experimental Study
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2017-02-26 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CBE-2017-02-26 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2017-02-26 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2017-02-26 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SOC-2017-02-26 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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