Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
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- George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
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