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Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard


  • Rocheteau, Guillaume


This paper analyzes the consequences of a working time reduction within a matching model with worker moral hazard. In the "laissez faire", workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When the no-shirking condition (NSC) is binding, the number of working hours is lower than the level that would be negotiated in the case of perfect monitoring and a work-sharing policy increases aggregate employment. At the opposite, for low unemployment countries, the NSC does not bind and a working time regulation always worsens the labour market situation.
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Suggested Citation

  • Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2002. "Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 387-425, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:84:y:2002:i:3:p:387-425

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jennifer Hunt, 1999. "Has Work-Sharing Worked in Germany?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 117-148.
    2. Mortensen, Dale T. & Pissarides, Christopher A., 1999. "New developments in models of search in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 39, pages 2567-2627 Elsevier.
    3. Tore Ellingsen & Asa Rosen, 2003. "Fixed or Flexible? Wage-setting in Search Equilibrium," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(278), pages 233-250, May.
    4. Boaz Moselle, 1996. "Efficiency Wages and the Hours/Unemployment Trade-Off," Discussion Papers 1153, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 257-273, April.
    6. Tor Jacobson & Henry Ohlsson, 2000. "Working time, employment, and work sharing: Evidence from Sweden," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 169-187.
    7. Jennifer Hunt, 1998. "Hours Reductions as Work-Sharing," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 339-381.
    8. Brunello, Giorgio, 1989. "The Employment Effects of Shorter Working Hours: An Application to Japanese Data," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(224), pages 473-486, November.
    9. Hoel, Michael & Vale, Bent, 1986. "Effects on unemployment of reduced working time in an economy where firms set wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1097-1104, October.
    10. Booth, Alison & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Employment and Length of the Working Week in a Unionized Economy in which Hours of Work Influence Productivity," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 69(207), pages 428-436, December.
    11. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2000. "Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1291-1326, June.
    12. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 1999. "Balanced-Budget Rules and Indeterminacy of the Equilibrium Unemployment Rate," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 399-409, July.
    13. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    14. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    15. Booth, Alison & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 1987. "The Employment Effects of a Shorter Working Week," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(214), pages 237-248, May.
    16. Calmfors, Lars, 1985. "Work sharing, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 293-309.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Logeay & Sven Schreiber, 2006. "Testing the effectiveness of the French work-sharing reform: a forecasting approach," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(17), pages 2053-2068.
    2. Fella Giulio, 2012. "Matching, Wage Rigidities and Efficient Severance Pay," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-35, December.
    3. Been-Lon Chen & Chih-Fang Lai, 2016. "Relative effects of labor taxes on employment and working hours: role of mechanisms shaping working hours," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 117(1), pages 49-84, January.
    4. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2001. "Equilibrium unemployment and wage formation with matching frictions and worker moral hazard," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 75-102, January.
    5. Antonio García Sánchez & María del Mar Vázquez Méndez, 2005. "The timing of work in a general equilibrium model with shiftwork," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(1), pages 149-179, January.
    6. repec:clr:wugarc:y:2016v:42i:04p:665 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:clr:wugarc:y:2016v:42i:4p:665 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2000. "Employment and distributional effects of restricting working time," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1291-1326, June.
    9. Patrick Artus & Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2007. "Réglementation du temps de travail, revenu et emploi," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00255820, HAL.
    10. Altavilla, Carlo & Garofalo, Antonio & Vinci, Concetto Paolo, 2005. "Evaluating the effects of working hours on employment and wages," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 647-664, September.
    11. Arslan, Yavuz & Taskin, Temel, 2011. "Explaining the gender gaps in unemployment across OECD countries," MPRA Paper 34873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Norikazu Tawara, 2008. "No-shirking Conditions in Frictional Labor Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10.
    13. Willington, Manuel & Navarro, Lucas, 2015. "Work hours regulation in a search economy with adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 46-48.
    14. Schreiber, Sven, 2008. "Did work-sharing work in France? Evidence from a structural co-integrated VAR model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 478-490, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search


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