Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard
This paper analyzes the consequences of a working time reduction within a matching model with worker moral hazard. In the "laissez faire", workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When the no-shirking condition (NSC) is binding, the number of working hours is lower than the level that would be negotiated in the case of perfect monitoring and a work-sharing policy increases aggregate employment. At the opposite, for low unemployment countries, the NSC does not bind and a working time regulation always worsens the labour market situation.
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