On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
This paper describes a simple framework for evaluating the allocative performance of economies characterized by trading frictions and unemployment. This framework integrates the normative results of earlier Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides bilateral matching-bargaining models of trade coordination and price-setting, and consists of a set of general conditions for constrained Pareto efficient resource allocation that are applicable to conventional natural rate models. To illustrate, several conventional models of the labour market are reformulated as matching-bargaining problems and analyzed using this framework.
Volume (Year): 57 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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