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Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Rebitzer, James B
  • Taylor, Lowell J

Abstract

This paper examines the role that work incentives play in the determination of work hours. The authors use a conventional efficiency wage model to analyze how firms respond to worker preferences regarding wage-hours packages. In contrast to previous work, they study markets in which workers have heterogeneous preferences. In this context, the authors demonstrate that job offers will specify both wages and work hours and many individuals will not be able to work their preferred number of hours. They show that the labor-market equilibrium may be characterized by a less than optimal number of short-hour jobs. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 257-273, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:33:y:1995:i:2:p:257-73
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    Cited by:

    1. Cowling, Marc, 2007. "Still At Work? An empirical test of competing theories of long hours culture," MPRA Paper 1614, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lonnie Golden & Stuart Glosser, 2013. "Work sharing as a potential policy tool for creating more and better employment: A review of the evidence," Chapters, in: Jon C. Messenger & Naj Ghosheh (ed.), Work Sharing during the Great Recession, chapter 7, pages 203-258, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Joseph Altonji & Jennifer Oldham, 2003. "Vacation laws and annual work hours," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 27(Q III), pages 19-29.
    4. Amodio, Francesco & de Roux, Nicolás, 2021. "Labor Market Power in Developing Countries: Evidence from Colombian Plants," CEPR Discussion Papers 16180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Ali Fakih, 2014. "Vacation Leave, Work Hours, and Wages: New Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 28(4), pages 376-398, December.
    6. Ali Fakih, 2014. "Availability of Family-Friendly Work Practices and Implicit Wage Costs: New Evidence from Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-33, CIRANO.
    7. John Pencavel, 2016. "Whose Preferences Are Revealed In Hours Of Work?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 9-24, January.
    8. Beckmannshagen, Mattis & Schröder, Carsten, 2022. "Earnings inequality and working hours mismatch," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    9. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2002. "Working time regulation in a search economy with worker moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 387-425, June.
    10. Dora Gicheva, 2013. "Working Long Hours and Early Career Outcomes in the High-End Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(4), pages 785-824.
    11. M. Keith Chen & Judith A. Chevalier & Peter E. Rossi & Emily Oehlsen, 2019. "The Value of Flexible Work: Evidence from Uber Drivers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 2735-2794.
    12. Patricia E. van Echtelt & Arie C. Glebbeek & Siegwart M. Lindenberg, 2006. "The new lumpiness of work," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 20(3), pages 493-512, September.
    13. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 42-58, January.
    14. Claudia Goldin, 2014. "A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1091-1119, April.
    15. Lonnie Golden, 2009. "A Brief History of Long Work Time and the Contemporary Sources of Overwork," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 84(2), pages 217-227, January.
    16. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    17. Joseph G. Altonji & Emiko Usui, 2007. "Work Hours, Wages, and Vacation Leave," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 60(3), pages 408-428, April.
    18. Denise J. Doiron, 2003. "Is Under‐Employment due to Labour Hoarding? Evidence from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(246), pages 306-323, September.
    19. Benedikt Gerst & Christian Grund, 2023. "Gender-Specific Duration of Parental Leave and Current Earnings," Work, Employment & Society, British Sociological Association, vol. 37(1), pages 215-235, February.
    20. David Campbell & Francis Green, 2002. "The Long Term Pay-Off From Working Longer Hours," Studies in Economics 0205, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    21. Lehmann, Jee-Yeon, 2011. "Job assignment and promotion under statistical discrimination: evidence from the early careers of lawyers," MPRA Paper 33466, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Technological Change,Labour Contracts and Income Distribution," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 24-35, Spring.
    23. Francis Green, 2000. "Why has Work Effort become more intense? Conjectures and Evidence about Effort-Biased Technical Change and other stories," Studies in Economics 0003, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    24. Oh, Seung-Yun & Park, Yongjin & Bowles, Samuel, 2012. "Veblen effects, political representation, and the reduction in working time over the 20th century," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 218-242.

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