Technological Change,Labour Contracts and Income Distribution
An overlapping-generations model is developed; human capital, embodied in education and general on-the-job training, is important, necessitating investments in the first period of work. Competition among employers combined with shortterm contracting imposes an incentive constraint on the intertemporal wage payments which is costly due to creditmarket imperfections. Workers work too much and are paid too little in the first period. Exogenous technological change complementary with skills aggravates the wage distortion, thereby inducing compensating wage increases. Income taxes mitigate the distortions.
Volume (Year): 15 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.taloustieteellinenyhdistys.fi|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991.
"A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,"
NBER Working Papers
3906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," Working papers 592, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1991. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 233, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991.
"Monotone Comparative Statics,"
11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- David E. Wildasin, 2000. "Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 73-95, March.
- Andersson, Fredrik, 1996. "Income taxation and job-market signaling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 277-298, February.
- Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
- Hermalin Benjamin E., 2002.
"Adverse Selection, Short-Term Contracting, and the Underprovision of On-the-Job Training,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-21, July.
- Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990. "Adverse Selection, Short-Term Contracting, and the Underprovision of On-the-Job Training," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3636n9n2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Benjamin Hermalin., 1990. "Adverse Selection, Short-Term Contracting, and the Underprovision of On-the-Job Training," Economics Working Papers 90-139, University of California at Berkeley.
- Anderberg, Dan & Andersson, Fredrik, 2000. "Social Insurance with Risk-Reducing Investments," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 67(265), pages 37-56, February.
- James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991.
"Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives,"
NBER Working Papers
3883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rebitzer, James B & Taylor, Lowell J, 1995. "Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 257-73, April.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:4:p:1321-1358 is not listed on IDEAS
- Salop, Steven C, 1979. "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 117-25, March.
- Ritter, Joseph A & Taylor, Lowell J, 1994. "Workers as Creditors: Performance Bonds and Efficiency Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 694-704, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:15:y:2002:i:1:p:24-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Secretary)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.