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Income taxation and job-market signaling

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  • Andersson, Fredrik

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  • Andersson, Fredrik, 1996. "Income taxation and job-market signaling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 277-298, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:59:y:1996:i:2:p:277-298
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042, Elsevier.
    2. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    3. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    4. Ireland, Norman J., 1994. "On limiting the market for status signals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 91-110, January.
    5. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    6. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    7. Fredrik Andersson, 1994. "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 251-274, December.
    8. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Union strategy and optimal direct taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 393-402, January.
    2. Spencer Bastani & Tomer Blumkin & Luca Micheletto, 2021. "Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling," CESifo Working Paper Series 9210, CESifo.
    3. Tri Vi Dang & Florian Morath, 2013. "The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2013-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Spencer Bastani & Tomer Blumkin & Luca Micheletto, 2025. "Optimal Redistribution And Education Signaling," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(3), pages 1239-1265, August.
    5. Schroyen, Fred, 1997. "Pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 343-366, September.
    6. Ashley C. Craig, 2023. "Optimal Income Taxation with Spillovers from Employer Learning," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 82-125, May.
    7. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Union Strategy and Optimal Income Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1545, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Daniel Gottlieb & Lucas Maestri, 2004. "Banning Information As A Redistributive Device," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 046, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    9. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Technological Change,Labour Contracts and Income Distribution," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 24-35, Spring.
    10. Lu, Zhuoran, 2025. "Selling signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    11. Fredrik Andersson, 1994. "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 251-274, December.

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