Income taxation and job-market signaling
No abstract is available for this item.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Riley, John G, 1979.
Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1981.
"Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation,"
NBER Working Papers
0632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987.
"Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987. "Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics," NBER Working Papers 2189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997.
"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
896, David K. Levine.
- Ireland, Norman J., 1994. "On limiting the market for status signals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 91-110, January.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
- Fredrik Andersson, 1994. "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 251-274, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:59:y:1996:i:2:p:277-298. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.