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Banning information as a redistributive device

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  • Gottlieb, Daniel
  • Maestri, Lucas Jóver

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the optimality of allowing firms to observe signals of workers’ characteristics in an optimal taxation framework. We show that it is always optimal to prohibit signals that disclose information about differences in the intrinsic productivities of workers like mandatory health exams and IQ tests, for example. On the other hand, it is never optimal to forbid signals that reveal information about the comparative advantages of workers like their specialization and profession. When signals are mixed (they disclose both types of information), there is a trade-off between efficiency and equity. It is optimal to prohibit signals with sufficiently low comparative advantage content.

Suggested Citation

  • Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas Jóver, 2004. "Banning information as a redistributive device," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 555, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgewp:555
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    2. Fernando de Holanda Barbosa, 2017. "Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation Under Rational Expectations," SpringerBriefs in Economics, in: Exploring the Mechanics of Chronic Inflation and Hyperinflation, chapter 0, pages 77-91, Springer.
    3. Athayde, Gustavo M. de & Flôres Junior, Renato Galvão, 2004. "Do higher moments really matter in portfolio choice?," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 574, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    4. Horowitz, Andrew W. & Flôres Junior, Renato Galvão, 2004. "Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 576, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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