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On the screening power of incentive schemes

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  • Fredrik Andersson

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Fredrik Andersson, 1994. "On the screening power of incentive schemes," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 251-274, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:251-274
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02716625
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new new welfare economics," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 991-1042 Elsevier.
    3. Andersson, Fredrik, 1996. "Income taxation and job-market signaling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 277-298, February.
    4. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-1190, September.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, March.
    6. Caillaud Bernard & Hermalin Benjamin, 1993. "The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 83-113, June.
    7. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    8. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    9. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    10. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    11. Asheim, Geir B., 1991. "Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 278-294, August.
    12. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andersson, Fredrik, 1996. "Income taxation and job-market signaling," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 277-298, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D82; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Signaling; Incentive contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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