Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
The authors develop two themes in the theory of incentive schemes. First, one need not always use all of the information available in an optimal incentive contract. Accounting information, which aggregates performance over time, is sufficient for optimal compensation schemes in certain classes of environments. Second, optimal rules in a rich environment must work well in a range of circumstances and cannot, therefore, be complicated functions of the observed outcome. The authors illustrate these ideas in a particular model where the agent has a rich space of controls, showing that the unique optimal compensation scheme is a linear function of profits. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.
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Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 303-28
| Handle: | RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:2:p:303-28 |
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"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
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"Moral hazard and observability,"
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- Bengt Holmstrom, 1997. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1205, David K. Levine.
- Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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