Does improved information improve incentives?
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- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
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Cited by:
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023.
"The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring,"
Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
- Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Chang, Jen-Wen, 2020. "Monitoring and competing principals: A double-edged sword," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
- Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
- Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018. "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers 12588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
executive compensation; limited liability; options; relative performance evaluation; risk management;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-HRM-2020-04-13 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2020-04-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2020-04-13 (Operations Research)
- NEP-RMG-2020-04-13 (Risk Management)
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