Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance
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- DeMarzo, Peter & Kaniel, Ron, 2016. "Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 11538, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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