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Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes


Top JEL
/ D: Microeconomics
/ / D8: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
/ / / D86: Economics of Contract Law
This JEL code is mentioned in the follow RePEc Biblio entries:
  1. > Microeconomics > Transaction Cost Economics

This topic is covered by the following reading lists:
  1. SOEP based publications
  2. Technology Assessment

Most recent items first, undated at the end.
  • 2015 Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs
    by Boone, J. & Schottmuller, C.

  • 2015 Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs
    by Boone, J. & Schottmuller, C.

  • 2015 Search and ripoff externalities
    by Armstrong, Mark

  • 2015 Capital-Labor Distortions in Project Finance
    by Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo

  • 2015 Dynamic Moral Hazard without Commitment
    by Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson

  • 2015 Venture Capital and Knowledge Transfer
    by Dessí, Roberta & Yin, Nina

  • 2015 Why organizations fail: models and cases
    by Garicano, Luis & Rayo, Luis

  • 2015 Health provider networks, quality and costs
    by Boone, Jan & Schottmüller, Christoph

  • 2015 Motivating Informed Decisions
    by Andres Zambrano

  • 2015 Size Matters - "Over"investments in a Relational Contracting Setting
    by Florian Englmaier & Matthias Fahn

  • 2015 Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
    by Chandrasekher, Madhav

  • 2015 Az állami támogatás hatása a projektfinanszírozásra erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett. Szerződéselméleti megközelítés
    by Berlinger, Edina & Juhász, Péter & Lovas, Anita

  • 2015 Privatization, financial development, property rights and growth
    by Marcelin, Isaac & Mathur, Ike

  • 2015 Optimal Design of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Renegotiation
    by Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger

  • 2015 Robustness and Linear Contracts
    by Gabriel Carroll

  • 2014 Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment
    by Englmaier, Florian & Strasser, Sebastian & Winter, Joachim

  • 2014 Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
    by Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas

  • 2014 Fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers
    by Jean Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard

  • 2014 An envelope approach to tournament design
    by Christian Ewerhart

  • 2014 Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
    by Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening

  • 2014 Sequential, multidimensional screening
    by Litterscheid, Sina & Szalay, Dezsö

  • 2014 Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation
    by Schmidt, Klaus & Herweg, Fabian

  • 2014 An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation
    by Pollrich, Martin & Schmidt, Robert

  • 2014 A repeated principal-agent model with on-the-job search
    by Herbold, Daniel

  • 2014 Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
    by Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias

  • 2014 Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies
    by Jovanovic, Dragan

  • 2014 Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
    by Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie

  • 2014 Institutional Analysis of Property Rights: Means of Individualization (Trademark) as an Institutional Alternative in Ensuring Quality and Specific Performance
    by Shulga Ivan & Eliseev Aleksander & Kuznetsova Tatiana

  • 2014 Optimal Sourcing Orders under Supply Disruptions and the Strategic Use of Buffer Suppliers
    by Sarah Parlane & Ying-Yi Tsai

  • 2014 Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts
    by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François

  • 2014 Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation
    by Yamashita, Takuro

  • 2014 Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade
    by Yamashita, Takuro

  • 2014 Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
    by Ulbricht, Robert

  • 2014 Pricing a Package of Services - When (not) to bundle
    by Ketelaar, Felix & Szalay, Dezsö

  • 2014 Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation
    by Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias

  • 2014 Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation
    by Pollrich, Martin & Schmidt, Robert C.

  • 2014 Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
    by Ulbricht, Robert

  • 2014 Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
    by Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Müller, Daniel

  • 2014 On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
    by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié

  • 2014 Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
    by Jon X. Eguia & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton & Antonio Nicolò

  • 2014 Stock-based Compensation Plans and Employee Incentives
    by Jan Zabojnik

  • 2014 On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities
    by Ledenyov, Dimitri O. & Ledenyov, Viktor O.

  • 2014 Search Deterrence
    by Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong

  • 2014 On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities
    by Ledenyov, Dimitri O. & Ledenyov, Viktor O.

  • 2014 On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities
    by Ledenyov, Dimitri O. & Ledenyov, Viktor O.

  • 2014 Inequality aversion in long-term contracts
    by Cato, Susumu & Ebina, Takeshi

  • 2014 A Physics Solution to the Hardest Problem in Social Science: Physics Foundation of Permanent World Peace
    by Wayne, James J.

  • 2014 A theory of family education incentives and inequality
    by Jellal, Mohamed

  • 2014 Theory of civil war under asymmetric information
    by Jellal, Mohamed

  • 2014 Diaspora famille transferts et contrat implicite
    by Jellal, Mohamed

  • 2014 Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités
    by Jellal, Mohamed

  • 2014 Diagramas de argumentación y política criminal
    by Estrada, Fernando

  • 2014 Efficient Microlending without Joint Liability
    by Altınok, Ahmet & Sever, Can

  • 2014 Timing of Earnings and Capital Structure
    by Miglo, Anton

  • 2014 A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement
    by Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars

  • 2014 Forgive, or Award, Your Debtor? - A Barrier Option Approach
    by Sun, David & Chow, Da-Ching

  • 2014 Dissolution of Partnerships in Infinitely Repeated Games
    by Alistair Wilson & Hong Wu

  • 2014 Destructive Agents, Finance Firms, and Systemic Risk
    by Natasa Bilkic & Thomas Gries

  • 2014 A results-based incentive scheme to improve performance
    by Ana María Becerra & Juan F. Castro & Gustavo Yamada

  • 2014 Public-Private Partnership: Information Externality in Sequential Investments
    by Marco Buso

  • 2014 Relational Contracts and Specific Training
    by James Malcomson

  • 2014 Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints
    by Aggey Semenov

  • 2014 The Generalized Informativeness Principle
    by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb

  • 2014 Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality
    by Attila Ambrus & Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Matt Elliott

  • 2014 Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment
    by Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino

  • 2014 The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
    by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb

  • 2014 Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices
    by Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley

  • 2014 The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
    by Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb

  • 2014 Evidence for Relational Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending
    by Peter Benczur & Cosmin L. Ilut

  • 2014 On the Interaction of Memory and Procrastination: Implications for Reminders
    by Keith M Marzilli Ericson

  • 2014 Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
    by Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró i Miquel

  • 2014 Inducing Leaders to Take Risky Decisions: Dismissal, Tenure, and Term Limits
    by Philippe Aghion & Matthew Jackson

  • 2014 When Consumers Do Not Make an Active Decision: Dynamic Default Rules and their Equilibrium Effects
    by Keith M. Marzilli Ericson

  • 2014 Structuring Incentives Within Organizations: The Case of Accountable Care Organizations
    by Brigham Frandsen & James B. Rebitzer

  • 2014 Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements
    by J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon

  • 2014 Motivational Capital and Incentives in Health Care Organizations
    by Mikel Berdud & Juan M. Cabasés Hita & Jorge Nieto

  • 2014 A Pilot Inquiry on Incentives and Intrinsic Motivation in Health Care: the Motivational Capital Explained by Doctors
    by Mikel Berdud & Juan M. Cabasés Hita & Jorge Nieto

  • 2014 Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders
    by Philipp Meyer-Brauns

  • 2014 Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
    by Jon X. Eguia & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Rebecca Morton & Antonio Nicolò

  • 2014 Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective
    by Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet

  • 2014 Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts
    by Ahmed Barkaoui & Arnaud Dragicevic

  • 2014 Contracting for Multiple Goods under Asymmetric Information: The Two-goods Case
    by Kazumi Hori

  • 2014 Pay-for-(Persistent)-Luck: CEO Bonuses Under Relational and Formal Contracting
    by Jed DeVaro & Jin-Hyuk Kim & Nick Vikander

  • 2014 Strategic Incomplete Contracts: Theory and Experiments
    by Erkal, Nisvan & Wu, Steven Y. & Roe, Brian E.

  • 2014 Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
    by Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom

  • 2014 Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
    by Bi, Sheng & Langot, François

  • 2014 On the Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms in General Quasi-linear Environments
    by Yu Chen

  • 2014 Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets: Cross-Subsidies and Quantity Discounts
    by Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François

  • 2014 What is Wrong with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Problems in the Conventional Economic Theory
    by Bertrand Lemennicier

  • 2014 Multitasking and performance measurement
    by Nannerup, Niels & Olsen, Kasper Krogh

  • 2014 Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
    by Wärneryd, Karl

  • 2014 Degrees of freedom in road construction
    by Nyström, Johan & Lind , Hans & Nilsson , Jan-Eric

  • 2014 Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts
    by Beyhaghi, Mehdi & Mahmoudi, Babak & Mohammadi, Ali

  • 2014 Disputes, Debt and Equity
    by Alfred Duncan & Charles Nolan

  • 2014 Asymmetric Information and Opportunistic Behaviour in Ex Ante Contract Negotiations: Precontractual Liability Regime
    by Angelo Castaldo & Elisabetta Conte & Gianluigi Galeotti

  • 2014 The Complexity of CEO Compensation
    by Jarque, Arantxa

  • 2014 Bidding for Conservation Contracts
    by Author-Name: Luca Di Corato & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto

  • 2014 Risk Attitudes and Shirking on the Quality of Work under Monitoring: Evidence from a Real-Effort Task Experiment
    by Seeun JUNG

  • 2014 Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge
    by William Fuchs & Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo

  • 2014 Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information
    by Jonathan P. Thomas (The University of Edinburgh) & Tim Worrall (The University of Edinburgh)

  • 2014 Signaling with Audits: Mimicry, Wasteful Expenditures, and Non-compliance in a Model of Tax Enforcement
    by Kotowski, Maciej H. & Weisbach, David A. & Zeckhauser, Richard J.

  • 2014 Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision
    by Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer

  • 2014 Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion : II. Must-Stock Products
    by Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer

  • 2014 Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion : I. Buyer Opportunism
    by Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer

  • 2014 The Ratchet Effect Re-examined: A Learning Perspective
    by Bhaskar, Venkataraman

  • 2014 Delegation and Dynamic Incentives
    by Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland

  • 2014 Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay
    by Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus

  • 2014 Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
    by Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Muller, Daniel

  • 2014 Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution, and Standardization
    by Gennaioli, Nicola & Perotti, Enrico C & Ponzetto, Giacomo AM

  • 2014 Pricing a Package of Services
    by Ketelaar, Felix & Szalay, Dezso

  • 2014 The Generalized Informativeness Principle
    by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel

  • 2014 Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation
    by Bester, Helmut & Dahm, Matthias

  • 2014 Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
    by Muller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2014 The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
    by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel

  • 2014 Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices
    by Buffa, Andrea & Vayanos, Dimitri & Woolley, Paul

  • 2014 The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
    by Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel

  • 2014 Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2014 Managing Intrinsic Motivation in a Long-Run Relationship
    by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran

  • 2014 Endogenous Contractual Externalities
    by Ozdenoren, Emre & Yuan, Kathy

  • 2014 R&D Investment and Financial Frictions
    by Oscar M. Valencia

  • 2014 Optimal Income Taxation with Asset Accumulation
    by Árpád Ábrahám & Sebastian Koehne & Nicola Pavoni

  • 2014 Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts
    by Karl Wärneryd

  • 2014 Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
    by Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening

  • 2014 Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion: II. Must-Stock Products
    by Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer

  • 2014 Nonlinear Pricing and Exclusion: I. Buyer Opportunism
    by Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer

  • 2014 The Commitment Role of Equity Financing
    by Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser

  • 2014 Communicating Subjective Evaluations
    by Matthias Lang

  • 2014 Delegation and Dynamic Incentives
    by Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz

  • 2014 Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
    by Fabian Herweg & Heiko Karle & Daniel Müller

  • 2014 Incentives to Motivate
    by Ola Kvaløy & Anja Schöttner

  • 2014 Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment With Framed Incentives
    by Jonathan de Quidt

  • 2014 Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge
    by William Fuchs & Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo

  • 2014 Peer Effects and Incentives
    by Matthias Kräkel

  • 2014 Competition and Screening with Skilled and Motivated Workers
    by F. Barigozzi & N. Burani

  • 2014 Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive-compatible Securitization
    by G. Chiesa

  • 2014 Standardized Enforcement: Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution and Standardization
    by Nicola Gennaioli & Enrico Perotti & Giacomo Ponzetto

  • 2014 Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization
    by Giacomo Ponzetto

  • 2014 Packaging of Sin Goods - Commitment or Exploitation?
    by Julia Nafziger

  • 2014 Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection
    by Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François & Attar, Andrea

  • 2014 Integración vertical y contratos gerenciales: herramientas estratégicas en mercados imperfectos
    by Flavio Jácome Liévano & Andrés Mejía Villa & Karen Mendoza Manjarrés

  • 2014 Explaining equity shares in international joint ventures: Combining the influence of asset characteristics, culture and institutional differences
    by Bowe, Michael & Golesorkhi, Sougand & Yamin, Mo

  • 2014 Motivating innovation in newly public firms
    by Baranchuk, Nina & Kieschnick, Robert & Moussawi, Rabih

  • 2014 Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents
    by Myerson, Roger B.

  • 2014 A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles
    by Barlevy, Gadi

  • 2014 Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
    by Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik

  • 2014 Investments as signals of outside options
    by Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2014 Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
    by Moroni, Sofia & Swinkels, Jeroen

  • 2014 Worker characteristics and wage differentials: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment
    by Englmaier, Florian & Strasser, Sebastian & Winter, Joachim

  • 2014 The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach
    by Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver

  • 2014 Deferred compensation vs. efficiency wages: An experimental test of effort provision and self-selection
    by Macpherson, David A. & Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C.

  • 2014 Banking risk and macroeconomic fluctuations
    by Jin, Yi & Zeng, Zhixiong

  • 2014 Implications of power: When the CEO can pressure the CFO to bias reports
    by Friedman, Henry L.

  • 2014 Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
    by Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Porteiro, Nicolás

  • 2014 Wealth effects and agency costs
    by Chade, Hector & Vera de Serio, Virginia N.

  • 2014 Biomass feedstock contracts: Role of land quality and yield variability in near term feasibility
    by Okwo, Adaora & Thomas, Valerie M.

  • 2014 On oil investment and production: A comparison of production sharing contracts and buyback contracts
    by Feng, Zhuo & Zhang, Shui-Bo & Gao, Ying

  • 2014 Excessive financial services CEO pay and financial crisis: Evidence from calibration estimation
    by Dong, Gang Nathan

  • 2014 Optimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers
    by Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas

  • 2014 Bonus pools and the informativeness principle
    by Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2014 Job design with sequential tasks and outcome externalities revisited
    by Pi, Jiancai

  • 2014 Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2014 Information provision before a contract is offered
    by Kim, Jaesoo & Shin, Dongsoo

  • 2014 On the value of relative comparisons in firms
    by Ramalingam, Abhijit

  • 2014 Moral hazard with the (unlikely) possibility of catastrophes
    by Bednarek, Ziemowit & Patel, Pratish

  • 2014 Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty
    by Terstiege, Stefan

  • 2014 Tournaments with gaps
    by Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2014 Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?
    by Laczó, Sarolta

  • 2014 Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard
    by Sun, Bo

  • 2014 Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts
    by Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi

  • 2014 Politicians and social leaders. Introducing a model of mutual relations and shaping beliefs of voters
    by Karol Fjalkowski

  • 2014 Behavioral Contract Theory
    by Botond Köszegi

  • 2014 Wasteful Sanctions, Underperformance, and Endogenous Supervision
    by David A. Miller Jr. & Kareen Rozen Jr.

  • 2014 Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital
    by Yeon-Koo Che & Rajiv Sethi

  • 2014 Risk-Taking and Risk-Sharing Incentives under Moral Hazard
    by Mohamed Belhaj & Renaud Bourl?s & Fr?d?ric Dero?an

  • 2014 At Least Do No Harm: The Use of Scarce Data
    by Alvaro Sandroni

  • 2014 Fraudulent Claims and Nitpicky Insurers
    by Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard

  • 2014 Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
    by Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steven Tadelis

  • 2013 Effort Incentives and On-the-Job Search: An Alternative Role for Efficiency Wages in Employment Contracts
    by Herbold, Daniel

  • 2013 Bad Mergers Revisited: An Incentive Perspective
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel

  • 2013 Discharge of residual debt: Do private and institutional lenders differ?
    by Kirchkamp, Oliver & Prömpers, Henning

  • 2013 Wage Bargaining when Workers Have Fairness Concerns
    by Kragl, Jenny & Gogova, Martina

  • 2013 Incentive Design and Mis-Allocated Effort
    by Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2013 Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
    by Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus

  • 2013 Subjective evaluation versus public information
    by Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes

  • 2013 Exit options and the allocation of authority
    by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2013 Legal evolution, contract evolution and standardization
    by Nicola Gennaioli & Enrico Perotti & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto

  • 2013 Royalty Rate Determination
    by Peter Dawson

  • 2013 Optimal Contract Orders and Relationship-Specific Investments in Vertical Organizations
    by Sarah Parlane & Ying-Yi Tsai

  • 2013 Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing Competition, Raising Prices
    by Marc Blatter & Silvio Sticher

  • 2013 Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations
    by Terstiege, Stefan

  • 2013 Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening
    by Terstiege, Stefan

  • 2013 Optimal Sequential Delegation
    by Kovác, Eugen & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2013 Bonus Pools and the Informativeness Principle
    by Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2013 Authority and Incentives in Organizations
    by Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2013 Tournaments with Gaps
    by Imhof, Lorens & Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2013 Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Müller, Daniel

  • 2013 Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority
    by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2013 Subjective Evaluation versus Public Information
    by Bester, Helmut & Münster, Johannes

  • 2013 Discriminatory Information Disclosure
    by Hao Li & Xianwen Shi

  • 2013 Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment
    by Rahul Deb & Maher Said

  • 2013 Implementation with Securities
    by Rahul Deb & Debasis Mishra

  • 2013 Maximizing Liquidity in Cloud Markets through Standardization of Computational Resources
    by Ivan Breskovic & Ivona Brandic & Jorn Altmann

  • 2013 Optimal Contracting with Altruism and Reciprocity
    by Matteo Bassi & Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo

  • 2013 On Repeated Moral Hazard with a Present Biased Agent
    by Luigi Balletta & Giovanni Immordino

  • 2013 Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures
    by Ojo, Marianne

  • 2013 Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures
    by Ojo, Marianne

  • 2013 Contingent Profit and Loss Sharing (C-Pls) Contracts
    by Nabi, Mahmoud Sami

  • 2013 Profit Sharing and Debt Contracts in Presence of Moral Hazard
    by Nabi, Mahmoud Sami

  • 2013 Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts
    by Beyhaghi, Mehdi & Mahmoudi, Babak & Mohammadi, Ali

  • 2013 Status, incentives and random favouritism
    by Dey, Oindrila & Banerjee, Swapnendu

  • 2013 Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach
    by Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P.

  • 2013 Market-based incentives
    by Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2013 Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
    by Liang, Pinghan

  • 2013 Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace
    by Donze, Jocelyn & Gunnes, Trude

  • 2013 When can we do better than autarky?
    by Tian, Guoqiang & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2013 Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
    by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach
    by Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P.

  • 2013 Observability of information gathering in agency models
    by Hoppe, Eva I.

  • 2013 A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
    by David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole

  • 2013 The Role of Incentives in Co-operation Failures
    by David Bartolini

  • 2013 Reducing Moral Hazard in Employment Relationships: Experimental Evidence on Managerial Control and Performance Pay
    by C. Kirabo Jackson & Henry S. Schneider

  • 2013 Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
    by Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun

  • 2013 Optimal Provision of Loans and Insurance Against Unemployment From A Lifetime Perspective
    by Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun

  • 2013 More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts
    by Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Oliver D. Hart

  • 2013 Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
    by Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole

  • 2013 Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?
    by Anil K Kashyap & Natalia Kovrijnykh

  • 2013 Optimal Managerial Contracts with Self-Esteem Concerns When Managers Can Hedge
    by Chongwoo Choe & Donald Lien & Chia-Feng Yu

  • 2013 Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others
    by Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella

  • 2013 Strategic Determination of Renegotiation Costs
    by Akitoshi Muramoto

  • 2013 Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model
    by Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori

  • 2013 Loss Aversion, Stochastic Compensation, and Team Incentives
    by Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka

  • 2013 Task Assignment under Agent Loss Aversion
    by Kohei Daido & Kimiyuki Morita & Takeshi Murooka & Hiromasa Ogawa

  • 2013 Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility
    by Fuchs, William

  • 2013 Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
    by Danilov, Anastasia & Sliwka, Dirk

  • 2013 Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
    by Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean

  • 2013 Authority and Incentives in Organizations
    by Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2013 Incentives, Wages, Employment, and the Division of Labor in Teams
    by Michael T. Rauh

  • 2013 Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
    by Yu Chen

  • 2013 Promoting coordination in summary-statistic games
    by Dominik Erharter

  • 2013 Implementation in multidimensional domains with ordinal restrictions
    by Debasis Mishra & Anup Pramanik & Souvik Roy

  • 2013 Implementation with securities
    by Rahul Deb & Debasis Mishra

  • 2013 Teams and Tournaments in Relational Contracts
    by Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E.

  • 2013 Employee Referral, Social Proximity And Worker Discipline: Theory And Evidence From India
    by Dhillon, Amrita & Iversen, Vegard & Torsvik, Gaute

  • 2013 The Hidden Cost of Specialization
    by Fabio Landini & Antonio Nicolò & Marco Piovesan

  • 2013 Competition, syndication, and entry in the venture capital market
    by Hong, Suting

  • 2013 A Theory of Threshold Contracts
    by Johannes Gerd Becker & Hans Gersbach

  • 2013 Compromises and Incentives
    by Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli & Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral

  • 2013 The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
    by Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet

  • 2013 Signaling Quality with Initially Reduced Royalty Rates
    by Heiko Karle & Christian Staat

  • 2013 A Note on Moral Hazard and Linear Compensation Schemes
    by Xiao Yu Wang

  • 2013 Contracting With Synergies
    by Edmans, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Zhu, John

  • 2013 Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2013 Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration
    by Iossa, Elisabetta & Rey, Patrick

  • 2013 Contracting With Synergies
    by Edmans, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Zhu, John

  • 2013 Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2013 Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
    by Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean

  • 2013 Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2013 Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2013 Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2013 La cuestión metodológica en Albert Hirschman
    by Germán Darío Valencia Agudelo

  • 2013 Can Results-Based Payments Reduce Corruption?-Working Paper 345
    by Charles Kenny, William Savedoff

  • 2013 Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
    by Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Troy J. Scott

  • 2013 Employee Referral, Social Proximity and Worker Discipline: Theory and Evidence from India
    by Amrita Dhillon & Vegard Iversen & Gaute Torsvik

  • 2013 Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
    by Miriam Schütte & Philipp Christoph Wichardt

  • 2013 Use and Abuse of Authority - A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
    by Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt

  • 2013 Screening as a Unified Theory of Delinquency, Renegotiation, and Bankruptcy
    by Natalia Kovrijnykh & Igor Livshits

  • 2013 Authority and Incentives in Organizations
    by Matthias Kräkel

  • 2013 Bidimensional screening with intrinsically motivated workers
    by F. Barigozzi & N. Burani

  • 2013 Welfare Improving Discrimination based on Cognitive Limitations
    by Oktay Sürücü

  • 2013 Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation
    by Giovanni di Iasio & Mario Quagliariello

  • 2013 Incentives for Research Agents: Optimal Contracts and Implementation
    by Yaping Shan

  • 2013 Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms
    by Hongbin Cai & Hongbin Li & Albert Park & Li-An Zhou

  • 2013 Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance
    by Conny Wunsch

  • 2013 Contingent preference for flexibility: eliciting beliefs from behavior
    by Sadowski, Philipp

  • 2013 Optimal Asset Taxes in Financial Markets with Aggregate Uncertainty
    by Florian Scheuer

  • 2013 On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
    by Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M.

  • 2013 Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: Family size and per capita consumption
    by Hosseini, Roozbeh & Jones, Larry E. & Shourideh, Ali

  • 2013 Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
    by Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory

  • 2013 A more general theory of commodity bundling
    by Armstrong, Mark

  • 2013 Repeated moral hazard with a time-inconsistent agent
    by Yılmaz, Murat

  • 2013 Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts
    by Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C.

  • 2013 Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services
    by Desrieux, Claudine & Chong, Eshien & Saussier, Stéphane

  • 2013 Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation
    by Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Innovation and waste in supply chain management
    by Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo

  • 2013 Toward a supply-side theory of financial innovation
    by Awrey, Dan

  • 2013 Pricing high-risk and low-risk insurance contracts with incomplete information and production costs
    by Ramsay, Colin M. & Oguledo, Victor I. & Pathak, Priya

  • 2013 Trading between agents for a better match
    by Lee, Frances (Zhiyun Xu)

  • 2013 Delegation of information verification
    by Kim, Doyoung

  • 2013 Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
    by Auster, Sarah

  • 2013 Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
    by Kadan, Ohad & Swinkels, Jeroen M.

  • 2013 Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
    by Liang, Pinghan

  • 2013 Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types
    by Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang

  • 2013 Recursive contracts, firm longevity, and rat races: An experimental analysis
    by Bardsley, Peter & Erkal, Nisvan & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Wilkening, Tom

  • 2013 The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments
    by Faravelli, Marco & Kirchkamp, Oliver & Rainer, Helmut

  • 2013 Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
    by Chung, Kim-Sau & Eső, Péter

  • 2013 The effect of an agent’s expertise on National Football League contract structure
    by Conlin, Michael & Orsini, Joe & Tang, Meng-Chi

  • 2013 Task assignment under agent loss aversion
    by Daido, Kohei & Morita, Kimiyuki & Murooka, Takeshi & Ogawa, Hiromasa

  • 2013 Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 When can we do better than autarky?
    by Tian, Guoqiang & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2013 A model of leverage based on risk sharing
    by Wang, Tianxi

  • 2013 Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Observability of information acquisition in agency models
    by Hoppe, Eva I.

  • 2013 Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2013 Optimism bias and incentive contracts in portfolio delegation
    by Wang, Jian & Sheng, Jiliang & Yang, Jun

  • 2013 Characterization of a risk sharing contract with one-sided commitment
    by Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2013 Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
    by Giat, Yahel & Subramanian, Ajay

  • 2013 La política de seguridad democrática y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales
    by Ernesto Cárdenas & Edgar Villa

  • 2013 Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information
    by Guillaume Roger

  • 2013 On the Efficiency of Codeshare Contracts between Airlines: Is Double Marginalization Eliminated?
    by Philip G. Gayle

  • 2013 Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment
    by Anja Sautmann

  • 2013 Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment
    by Natalia Kovrijnykh

  • 2013 Competition with Exclusive Contracts and Market-Share Discounts
    by Giacomo Calzolari & Vincenzo Denicol?

  • 2013 The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector
    by Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort

  • 2013 Managing Conflicts in Relational Contracts
    by Jin Li & Niko Matouschek

  • 2013 Matching with Contracts: Comment
    by Orhan Ayg?n & Tayfun S?nmez

  • 2012 Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation
    by Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt

  • 2012 Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
    by Björn Bartling & Klaus M. Schmidt

  • 2012 Mechanism design and intentions
    by Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer

  • 2012 Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments
    by Göller, Daniel

  • 2012 The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach
    by Gürtler, Marc & Gürtler, Oliver

  • 2012 Use and Abuse of Authority
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
    by Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition
    by Bartling, Björn & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 Excess Liquidity against Predation
    by Dai Zusai

  • 2012 Reciprocity in the Principal Multiple Agent Model
    by Giuseppe De Marco & Giovanni Immordino

  • 2012 Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions
    by Landeo, Claudia

  • 2012 It Takes Three to Tango: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Stipulated Damages
    by Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn

  • 2012 Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results
    by Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn

  • 2012 Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated Borrowers
    by Barigozzi, Francesca & Tedeschi, Piero

  • 2012 Forestry and the New Institutional Economics
    by Sen Wang & Tim Bogle & G. Cornelis van Kooten

  • 2012 Job Protection vs. Contracts At-Will: Trading-off Entrenchment and Shirking
    by Inderst, Roman

  • 2012 Network Investment, Access and Competition
    by Inderst, Roman & Peitz, Martin

  • 2012 “准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据
    by Yang, Ruilong & Wang, Yuan & Nie, Huihua

  • 2012 Short Communication: DEA based auctions
    by Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P.

  • 2012 Multi-dimensional auctions under information asymmetry for costs and qualities
    by Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P.

  • 2012 The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2012 Characterization of a Risk Sharing Contract with One-Sided Commitment
    by Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2012 Delegation to potentially uninformed agent
    by Semenov, Aggey

  • 2012 Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering
    by Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2012 Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2012 Enforceable vs. non-enforceable contracts: a theoretical appraisal with fair players
    by D'Agostino, Elena & Lisciandra, Maurizio

  • 2012 High Implicit Interest Rates in the Context of Informal Traditional Housing Transactions: Evidence from Morocco
    by Driouchi, Ahmed & Mertou, Amat

  • 2012 Herbert Simon: bounded rationality y teoría de las organizaciones
    by Estrada, Fernando

  • 2012 An Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Opportunism and Contracting Mechanisms
    by Lumineau, Fabrice & Quelin, Bertrand

  • 2012 Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2012 Imperfect Bundling In Public-Private Partnerships
    by Luciano Greco

  • 2012 The Limits to Compensation in the Financial Sector
    by H Peyton Young & Thomas Noe

  • 2012 Relational Incentive Contracts with Private Information
    by James Malcomson

  • 2012 Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information
    by James Malcomson

  • 2012 A More General Theory of Commodity Bundling
    by Mark Armstrong

  • 2012 Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent
    by Aggey Semenov

  • 2012 Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
    by Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad

  • 2012 A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement
    by Thomas F. Hellmann & Veikko Thiele

  • 2012 A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection
    by Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer

  • 2012 Incentives Beyond the Money: Identity and Motivational Capital in Public Organizations
    by Mikel Berdud & Juan M. Cabasés & Jorge Nieto

  • 2012 Motivational Capital and Incentives in Health Care Organisations
    by Mikel Berdud & Juan M. Cabasés Hita & Jorge Nieto

  • 2012 Contracting for Innovation under Knightian Uncertainty
    by Massimiliano Amarante & Mario Ghossoub & Edmund Phelps

  • 2012 Contracting for innovation under knightian uncertainty
    by AMARANTE, Massimiliano & GHOSSOUB, Mario & PHELPS, Edmund

  • 2012 R&D for Neglected Diseases
    by Nicola Dimitri

  • 2012 Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence
    by Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie-Claire Villeval

  • 2012 Communicating Subjective Evaluations
    by Matthias Lang

  • 2012 Duality in Contracting
    by Peter Bardsley

  • 2012 Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection
    by Seungjin Han

  • 2012 Screening with Congestion
    by Maxime Agbo & Marc Santugini & Jonathan W. Williams

  • 2012 Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting
    by Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet

  • 2012 Securitization and Optimal Retention under Moral Hazard
    by Sara Malekan & Georges Dionne

  • 2012 The First-Order Approach when the Cost of Effort is Money
    by Marie-Cécile Fagart & Claude Fluet

  • 2012 The Effect of Risk Preferences on the Valuation and Incentives of Compensation Contracts
    by Pierre Chaigneau

  • 2012 On the Value of Improved Informativeness
    by Pierre Chaigneau

  • 2012 Use and Abuse of Authority
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition
    by Bartling, Björn & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
    by Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
    by Reinshagen, Felix

  • 2012 Stock Market Tournaments
    by Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan

  • 2012 Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design
    by Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner

  • 2012 Mechanism Design and Intentions
    by Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer

  • 2012 Skill-Biased Technological Change, Organizational Change, and Wage Inequality
    by Kohei Daido & Ken Tabata

  • 2012 Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence
    by Robin, Stéphane R. & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire

  • 2012 Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence
    by Robin, Stéphane & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire

  • 2012 Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
    by Sheremeta, Roman M. & Wu, Steven Y.

  • 2012 Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
    by Sheremeta, Roman M. & Wu, Steven Y.

  • 2012 Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?
    by Yu Chen

  • 2012 Optimal contracts based on subjective evaluations and reciprocity
    by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl

  • 2012 Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal-agent relations
    by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl

  • 2012 An Optimal Incentive Contract Preventing Excessive Risk-Taking by a Bank Manager
    by Henry Penikas

  • 2012 Can Economics Explain Where All-Inclusive Deals are Offered?
    by Bladh, Christian & Holm, Håkan J.

  • 2012 Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health
    by Laun, Tobias

  • 2012 The Politics of Aid Effectiveness: Why Better Tools can Make for Worse Outcomes
    by Olofsgård, Anders

  • 2012 Procurement and contract design in the construction industry: … not one size fits all
    by Nilsson, Jan-Eric

  • 2012 Ambiguity, Agency Relationships and Adverse Selection
    by Gérard Mondello

  • 2012 Ingratiation and Favoritism : Experimental Evidence
    by Stéphane Robin & Agnieszka Rusinowska & Marie-Claire Villeval

  • 2012 Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages
    by Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto

  • 2012 Asymmetric Awareness and Moral Hazard
    by Sarah Auster

  • 2012 Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover
    by Ronald W. Anderson & Maria Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud

  • 2012 Commitment-Flexibility Trade-Off and Withdrawal Penalties
    by Attila Ambrus & Georgy Egorov

  • 2012 Delegation in Long-Term Relationships
    by Miriam Schütte & Philipp C. Wichardt

  • 2012 L’assurance habitation dans les départements d’Outre-mer : une faible souscription
    by Grislain-Letrémy, Céline & Calvet, Lucie

  • 2012 Nonlinear Pricing as Exclusionary Conduct
    by Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer

  • 2012 Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2012 Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization
    by Ponzetto, Giacomo AM

  • 2012 Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2012 Capital Regulation and Credit Fluctuations
    by Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles

  • 2012 Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2012 The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2012 Stock Market Tournaments
    by Ozdenoren, Emre & Yuan, Kathy

  • 2012 Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation
    by Bhaskar, Venkataraman

  • 2012 Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation
    by Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles

  • 2012 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts
    by Dessí, Roberta

  • 2012 La política de seguridad democrática y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales
    by Ernesto Cárdenas & Edgar Villa

  • 2012 Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
    by Fabian Herweg & Klaus Schmidt

  • 2012 Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design
    by Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman

  • 2012 Let's talk: How communication affects contract design
    by Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman

  • 2012 Gesundheitsfoerderliche Mitarbeiterfuehrung. Gestaltung von Massnahmen der Betrieblichen Gesundheitsfoerderung fuer Fuehrungskraefte
    by

  • 2012 High education efficiency wages in Colombia
    by Elcira Solano Benavides & Gabriel Navarro

  • 2012 Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments
    by Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas

  • 2012 Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
    by Zhang, Yuzhe & Ravikumar, B.

  • 2012 Bounded Rationality And Perfect Rationality: Psychology Into Economics
    by Daniele Schilirò

  • 2012 Las FARC y los costos del secuestro
    by Maria del Pilar Castillo & Giácomo Balbinotto

  • 2012 Earnings Management, Conservatism, and Earnings Quality
    by Ewert, Ralf & Wagenhofer, Alfred

  • 2012 Explicit and Implicit Incentives for Multiple Agents
    by Glover, Jonathan

  • 2012 Due Diligence, Research Joint Ventures, and Incentives to Innovate
    by Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert

  • 2012 Dismissal Tournaments
    by Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel

  • 2012 The Effect of Contract Regulation on Franchising
    by Jonathan Klick & Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein

  • 2012 Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results
    by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier

  • 2012 Experimental Evidence of the Relationship between Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms
    by Zev J. Eigen

  • 2012 Strategic choice of forward contracts and managerial incentive contracts in a context of Cournot competition
    by Sandra Miranda & Ximena Bernal & Flavio Jácome

  • 2012 Motivation through goal setting
    by Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín

  • 2012 Optimal securitization with moral hazard
    by Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei

  • 2012 Expropriation risk and technology
    by Opp, Marcus M.

  • 2012 Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum
    by Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R.

  • 2012 Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement
    by Raith, Michael

  • 2012 Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
    by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2012 Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions
    by Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David

  • 2012 Combinatorial agency
    by Babaioff, Moshe & Feldman, Michal & Nisan, Noam & Winter, Eyal

  • 2012 Prizes and patents: Using market signals to provide incentives for innovations
    by Chari, V.V. & Golosov, Mikhail & Tsyvinski, Aleh

  • 2012 Correlation and relative performance evaluation
    by Fleckinger, Pierre

  • 2012 Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
    by Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver

  • 2012 Contracting with self-esteem concerns
    by Ishida, Junichiro

  • 2012 Subprime mortgage design
    by Bhardwaj, Geetesh & Sengupta, Rajdeep

  • 2012 Ex ante versus ex post expectation damages
    by Liu, Zhiyong & Avraham, Ronen

  • 2012 Design of investment promotion policies
    by Kartasheva, Anastasia V.

  • 2012 Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
    by Terstiege, Stefan

  • 2012 Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
    by Filiz-Ozbay, Emel

  • 2012 Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
    by Non, Arjan

  • 2012 Optimal auctions with information acquisition
    by Shi, Xianwen

  • 2012 The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case
    by Silvers, Randy

  • 2012 Contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting
    by Alexander, Corinne & Ivanic, Rasto & Rosch, Stephanie & Tyner, Wallace & Wu, Steven Y. & Yoder, Joshua R.

  • 2012 The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2012 Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2012 Credit default swaps and risk-shifting
    by Campello, Murillo & Matta, Rafael

  • 2012 Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts
    by Jun, Jooyong & Yoon, Kyoung-Soo

  • 2012 Risk versus social preferences under the veil of ignorance
    by Frignani, Nicola & Ponti, Giovanni

  • 2012 On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
    by Ruiz del Portal, X.

  • 2012 Elección estratégica de contratos forward y contratos de incentivos gerenciales en un contexto de competencia a la Cournot
    by Miranda Forero, Sandra Liliana & Poveda Berna, lXimena & Jácome Liévano, Flavio Hernando

  • 2012 Behavioral Economics and Psychology of Incentives
    by Emir Kamenica

  • 2012 Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets: An Application to the US Mortgage Market
    by Jeremy M. Burke & Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman

  • 2012 Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities
    by Shai Bernstein & Eyal Winter

  • 2012 Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents
    by Florian Englmaier & Stephen Leider

  • 2012 Contracting in Vague Environments
    by Marie-Louise Vier�

  • 2012 Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts
    by John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers

  • 2011 Relationships and Growth
    by Shingo Ishiguro

  • 2011 International Business Alliance under Asymmetric Information: Technology vis-a`-vis Information Advantage
    by Chifeng Dai & Sajal Lahiri

  • 2011 How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
    by Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder

  • 2011 Competition and trust: Evidence from German car manufacturers
    by Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad O.

  • 2011 Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection
    by Han, Seungjin

  • 2011 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts
    by Dessi, Roberta

  • 2011 Adverse Selection Without Single Crossing
    by Schottmuller, C.

  • 2011 Towards Autonomic Market Management in Cloud Computing Infrastructures
    by Ivan Breskovic & Michael Maurer & Vincent C. Emeakaroha & Ivona Brandic & Jorn Altmann

  • 2011 Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness
    by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan

  • 2011 Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection
    by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié

  • 2011 A Note on Convex Transformations and the First Order Approach
    by Corrado Benassi

  • 2011 Subjective Evaluations with Performance Feedback
    by Jan Zabojnik

  • 2011 Refunds as a Metering Device
    by Inderst, Roman & Tirosh, Gilad

  • 2011 An organizational learning perspective on contract design
    by Lumineau, Fabrice & Frechet, Marc & Puthod, Dominique

  • 2011 Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
    by Grochulskiy, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2011 Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation
    by Barlo, Mehmet & Ozdogan, Ayca

  • 2011 A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization
    by Zeng, Zhixiong

  • 2011 Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate
    by Fabrizi, Simona & Lippert, Steffen

  • 2011 Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation
    by di Iasio, Giovanni & Quagliariello, Mario

  • 2011 Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
    by Mele, Antonio

  • 2011 Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics
    by Zudenkova, Galina

  • 2011 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality
    by Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2011 Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation
    by di Iasio, Giovanni & Quagliariello, Mario

  • 2011 Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets
    by Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro

  • 2011 Leading the Way: Coalitional Stability in Technological Cooperation & Sequential Climate Policy
    by Thomas Norman & Heinrich H. Nax

  • 2011 A Markov Test for Alpha
    by H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster and Robert Stine

  • 2011 A Strategy-Proof Test of Portfolio Returns
    by H Peyton Young & Dean P. Foster

  • 2011 Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate
    by Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert

  • 2011 Relationships and Growth
    by Shingo Ishiguro

  • 2011 Fair Contracts
    by Shingo Ishiguro

  • 2011 Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
    by Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari

  • 2011 Contracting With Synergies
    by Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein & John Y. Zhu

  • 2011 How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
    by Ernst Fehr & Oliver D. Hart & Christian Zehnder

  • 2011 Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points
    by Oliver D. Hart

  • 2011 Flexible contracts
    by Piero Gottardi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato

  • 2011 The Financial and Macroeconomic Implications of Banking Frictions and Banking Riskiness
    by Yi Jin & Zhixiong Zeng

  • 2011 Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity, and Rat Races: Theory and Experimental Evidence
    by Peter Bardsley & Nisvan Erkal & Nikos Nikiforakis & Tom Wilkening

  • 2011 Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation
    by Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis

  • 2011 Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
    by Ralph Boleslavsky & Maher Said

  • 2011 Dynamic Regulation Design Without Payments: Timing is Everything
    by Ralph Boleslavsky & David L. Kelly

  • 2011 Risk Classification in Insurance Contracting
    by Georges Dionne & Casey G. Rothschild

  • 2011 Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences
    by Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka

  • 2011 How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
    by Fehr, Ernst & Hart, Oliver & Zehnder, Christian

  • 2011 How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
    by Fehr, Ernst & Hart, Oliver & Zehnder, Christian

  • 2011 Social vs. risk preferences under the veil of ignorance
    by Nicola Frignani & Giovanni Ponti

  • 2011 The Division of Labor and The Theory of the Firm
    by Michael T. Rauh

  • 2011 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts
    by Dessi, Roberta

  • 2011 Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains
    by Govindan, Kannan & Popiuc, Maria Nicoleta

  • 2011 Mixed contracts for the newsvendor problem with real options
    by Jörnsten, Kurt & Nonås, Sigrid Lise & Sandal, Leif K. & Ubøe, Jan

  • 2011 The Defeasance of Control Rights
    by Bienz, Carsten & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Fluck, Zsuzsanna

  • 2011 Why are bids not more unbalanced?
    by Mandell, Svante & Nyström, Johan

  • 2011 Separation of Ownership and Control: Delegation as a Commitment Device
    by Aristotelis Boukouras

  • 2011 Information Aggregation and Adverse Selection
    by Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos

  • 2011 Contract Law and Development
    by Aristotelis Boukouras

  • 2011 Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks
    by Timo Hiller

  • 2011 Flexible contracts
    by Piero Gottardi & Jean Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato

  • 2011 Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts
    by Mohan Bijapur

  • 2011 A Multitask Model Without Any Externalities
    by Meg Sato & Kazuya Kamiya

  • 2011 Multi-Period Contract Problems with Verifiable and Unverifiable Outputs
    by Kazuya Kamiya & Meg Sato

  • 2011 Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending
    by Peter Benczur & Cosmin Ilut

  • 2011 Sussidiarietà, Identità e Governance comunitaria
    by Guido Merzoni

  • 2011 Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision
    by David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen

  • 2011 Make it challenging : motivation through goal setting
    by Joaquín Gómez Miñambres

  • 2011 The Provision of Wage Incentives : A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation
    by Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février

  • 2011 Taxation and Regulation of Bonus Pay
    by Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh

  • 2011 Travel Demand Model with Heterogeneous Users and Endogenous Congestion: An application to optimal pricing of bus services
    by Batarce, Marco & Ivaldi, Marc

  • 2011 Investments as Signals of Outside Options
    by Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2011 Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers
    by Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad

  • 2011 Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B
    by Iossa, Elisabetta & Spagnolo, Giancarlo

  • 2011 Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation
    by Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer & Patrick W. Schmitz

  • 2011 Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment
    by Florian Englmaier & Sebastian Strasser & Joachim Winter

  • 2011 Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
    by Arjan Non

  • 2011 Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect
    by Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita

  • 2011 Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers
    by Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Konrad O. Stahl

  • 2011 Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection
    by Theodoros M. Diasakos & Kostas Koufopoulos

  • 2011 Microcrédito com moral hazard
    by Rodrigo Peñaloza & Raquel Filgueiras

  • 2011 Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated Borrowers
    by F. Barigozzi & P. Tedeschi

  • 2011 Optimal Coexistence of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts in Labor Markets
    by Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolés Porteiro

  • 2011 Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets
    by Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolás Porteiro

  • 2011 Nonidentification of Insurance Models with Probability of Accidents
    by Gaurab Aryal & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong

  • 2011 Identification of Insurance Models with Multidimensional Screening
    by Gaurab Aryal & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong

  • 2011 The Virtual Architectural Studio – An Experiment of Online Cooperation
    by Raluca Livia Niculae

  • 2011 Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources
    by Hiroshi Osano

  • 2011 Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form Contracts
    by Abraham L. Wickelgren

  • 2011 A vállalati likviditáskezelés szerepe eszközfedezettel rendelkező hitelszerződésekben. Az alkun alapuló megközelítés eredményei
    by Havran, Dániel

  • 2011 Profit-Based Compensation and Corporate Tax Evasion
    by Jing Jun Chang

  • 2011 Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
    by Bierbrauer, Felix J.

  • 2011 CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking
    by Kim, E. Han & Lu, Yao

  • 2011 Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
    by Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2011 Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control
    by Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2011 Earnouts: A study of financial contracting in acquisition agreements
    by Cain, Matthew D. & Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K.

  • 2011 On the duration of technology licensing
    by Gordanier, John & Miao, Chun-Hui

  • 2011 Overconfidence and moral hazard
    by de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique

  • 2011 Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence
    by Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J.

  • 2011 A simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory
    by Immordino, Giovanni & Menichini, Anna Maria C. & Romano, Maria Grazia

  • 2011 Opportunistic renegotiation of infrastructure concessions as rent seeking: the effect of legal systems Gabriel Garcia Morales
    by Gabriel García Morales

  • 2011 Un contrat à obligation d'exécution peut-il résoudre le problème du hold-up ?
    by M’hand Fares

  • 2011 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?
    by Philippe Aghion & Richard Holden

  • 2011 Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare
    by Yongmin Chen & David E. M. Sappington

  • 2011 A Welfare Analysis of Arbitration
    by Wojciech Olszewski

  • 2011 Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
    by C. Kirabo Jackson & Henry S. Schneider

  • 2011, 3rd quarter update Two-part tariffs
    by Nikolaos Vettas

  • 2010 Optimal grading
    by Robertas Zubrickas

  • 2010 Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs
    by Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt

  • 2010 When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device
    by Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard

  • 2010 Das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung
    by Koch, Rosemarie & Stadtmann, Georg

  • 2010 Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way Distortion
    by Michela Cella & Federico Etro

  • 2010 Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design
    by Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov

  • 2010 The benefits of limited feedback in organizations
    by Stephen Eliot Hansen

  • 2010 Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands
    by Tigran Melkonyan & Michael Taylor

  • 2010 The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector
    by Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David

  • 2010 Jackpot Justice: The Value of Inefficient Litigation
    by Zhou, Jun

  • 2010 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
    by Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas

  • 2010 Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
    by Englmaier, Florian & Filipi, Ales & Singh, Ravi

  • 2010 Hierarchical Structures and Dynamic Incentives
    by Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland

  • 2010 Exclusion Through Speculation
    by Argenton, C. & Willems, Bert

  • 2010 Organization of Innovation and Capital Markets (Teknolojik Yeniligin Orgutlenmesi ve Sermaye Piyasalari)
    by Cuneyt Orman

  • 2010 Franchise Contracts with Ex Post Limited Liability
    by Evans, Shane

  • 2010 Menus of linear contracts in procurement with type-dependent reservation utility
    by Evans, Shane

  • 2010 Grid Business Models for Brokers Executing SLA-Based Workflows
    by Dang Minh Quan & Jorn Altmann

  • 2010 A New Bilateral Arrangement between Interconnected Providers
    by Ruzana Davoyan & Jorn Altmann & Wolfgang Effelsberg

  • 2010 Investigating the Role of a Transmission Initiator in Private Peering Arrangements
    by Ruzana Davoyan & Jorn Altmann

  • 2010 Exploring the Effect of Traffic Differentiation on Interconnection Cost Sharing
    by Ruzana Davoyan & Jorn Altmann & Wolfgang Effelsberg

  • 2010 Intercarrier Compensation in Unilateral and Bilateral Arrangements
    by Ruzana Davoyan & Jorn Altmann & Wolfgang Effelsberg

  • 2010 A Simple Impossibility Result in Behavioral Contract Theory
    by Annamaria Menichini & Giovanni Immordino & Maria Grazia Romano

  • 2010 Contracts with Wishful Thinkers
    by Annamaria Menichini & Giovanni Immordino & Maria Grazia Romano

  • 2010 Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability
    by Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella

  • 2010 Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons
    by Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié

  • 2010 Material Adverse Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics
    by David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias

  • 2010 Supplement to "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model"
    by Ghossoub, Mario

  • 2010 Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model
    by Ghossoub, Mario

  • 2010 Exclusive contracts in health insurance
    by Rahkovsky, Ilya

  • 2010 The contracts between leading agribusiness enterprises and rural households: its effects on firm-level export of agricultural products
    by Peng, Chao & Zeng, Yinchu & Huang, Bo & Yabe, Mitsuyasu

  • 2010 Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture
    by Bachev, Hrabrin

  • 2010 Agro-Ecosystem Services – Governance Needs and Efficiency
    by Bachev, Hrabrin

  • 2010 Job Mix, Performance Pay, and Matching Outcomes: Contracting with Multiple Heterogeneous Agents
    by Kim, Jaesoo & Sly, Nicholas

  • 2010 Incomplete Contracts: Foundations and Applications
    by Pei, Di

  • 2010 Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy in Madagascar
    by Bellemare, Marc F.

  • 2010 Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders: The Optimality of All Pay Mechanisms
    by Eisenhuth, Roland

  • 2010 Optimal Auditing in a Dynamic Model of Tax Compliance
    by Ravikumar, B. & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2010 Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Savings
    by Mitchell, Matthew & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2010 On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2010 Relative and Absolute Preference for Quality
    by Angyridis, Constantine & Sen, Debapriya

  • 2010 Local governments opting for PPPs in the schools sector
    by Carvalho, João & Cruz, Nuno & Cunha Marques, Rui

  • 2010 Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
    by Mele, Antonio

  • 2010 Inconsistency of fairness evaluation in simulated labot market
    by Ch'ng, Kean Siang & Loke, Yiing Jia

  • 2010 Relational Incentive Contracts
    by James Malcomson

  • 2010 The effects of costly exploration on optimal investment timing
    by Michi NISHIHARA & Takashi SHIBATA

  • 2010 An Empirical Study of Online Software Outsourcing: Signals under Different Contract Regimes
    by Mingfeng Lin & Siva Viswanathan & Ritu Agarwal

  • 2010 Information and Employee Evaluation: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention in Public Schools
    by Jonah E. Rockoff & Douglas O. Staiger & Thomas J. Kane & Eric S. Taylor

  • 2010 The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing
    by Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris

  • 2010 Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
    by Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta

  • 2010 On the optimality of optimal income taxation
    by Felix Bierbrauer

  • 2010 An incomplete contracts perspective on the provision and pricing of excludable public goods
    by Felix Bierbrauer

  • 2010 Mind the gap: accountability and value for money in public private partnerships
    by Eoin REEVES

  • 2010 Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion
    by Federco Etro & Michela Cella

  • 2010 EQUILIBRIUM PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS Competition and R&D Incentives
    by Federico Etro & Michela Cella

  • 2010 A Theory of Advocates: Trading Advice for In‡uence
    by Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis

  • 2010 Dynamic Relational Contracts with Credit Constraints
    by Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall

  • 2010 Screening, Competition, and Job Design
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2010 Subjective Performance Evaluations, Self-esteem, and Ego-threats in Principal-agent Relations
    by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl

  • 2010 Reporting Frequency and Substitutable Tasks
    by Christian Lukas

  • 2010 Organizational Modes within Firms and Productivity Growth
    by Kohei Daido & Ken Tabata

  • 2010 Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
    by Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2010 Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
    by Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2010 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave
    by Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas

  • 2010 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave
    by Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas

  • 2010 Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
    by Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein

  • 2010 Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
    by Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Roelfsema, Hein

  • 2010 Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance
    by Wunsch, Conny

  • 2010 Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance
    by Wunsch, Conny

  • 2010 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2010 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2010 Incomplete contracts, incentives and economic power
    by Sripad Motiram

  • 2010 Planes Mínimos Obligatorios en Mercados de Seguros de Salud Segmentados
    by Edmundo Beteta & Manuel Willington

  • 2010 The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector
    by Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David

  • 2010 Reducing asymmetric information with usage-based automobile insurance
    by Arvidsson, Sara

  • 2010 A Theory of Firm Decline
    by Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatal

  • 2010 Tractability in Incentive Contracting
    by Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier

  • 2010 Incomplete Contracts, Incentives and Economic Power
    by Sripad Motiram

  • 2010 Stairway to Heaven or Highway to Hell: Liquidity, Sweat Equity, and the Uncertain Path to Ownership
    by R. Vijay Krishna & Giuseppe Lopomo

  • 2010 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
    by Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt

  • 2010 Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing
    by Dirk Bergemann & Ji Shen & Yun Xu & Edmund M. Yeh

  • 2010 Stochastic Search Equilibrium
    by Giuseppe Moscarini & Fabien Postel-Vinay

  • 2010 Identification of a Class of Adverse Selection Models with Contracts Variation
    by Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février

  • 2010 Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Kusterer, David J & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2010 The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector
    by Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David

  • 2010 Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2010 Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave
    by Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas

  • 2010 Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms
    by Cai, Hongbin & Li, Hongbin & Park, Albert & Zhou, Li-An

  • 2010 Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
    by Philippon, Thomas & Skreta, Vasiliki

  • 2010 Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2010 Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions
    by Netzer, Nick & Schmutzler, Armin

  • 2010 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2010 The Institutional Foundations of China’s Reforms and Development
    by Xu, Cheng-Gang

  • 2010 Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidence
    by Eva I. Hoppe & David J. Kusterer

  • 2010 On the Optimality of Optimal Income Taxation
    by Felix Bierbrauer

  • 2010 Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
    by Florian Englmaier & Ales Filipi & Ravi Singh

  • 2010 The Dynamics of Climate Agreements
    by Bård Harstad

  • 2010 Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model
    by James Malcomson

  • 2010 Social Welfare versus Inequality Concerns in an Incomplete Contract Experiment
    by Marco Faravelli & Oliver Kirchkamp & Helmut Rainer

  • 2010 Flexible Contracts
    by Piero Gottardi & Jean Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato

  • 2010 On the Hidden Costs of Monitoring Corruption or Effort
    by Jana Krajcova

  • 2010 Hidden action, identification and organisation design
    by Wendelin Schnedler

  • 2010 Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes
    by Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner

  • 2010 The Benefits of Limited Feedback in Organizations
    by Stephen Eliot Hansen

  • 2010 Risk allocation and incentives for private contractors: an analysis of Italian project financing contracts
    by Rosalba Cori & Cristina Giorgiantonio & Ilaria Paradisi

  • 2010 Menus of Linear Contracts in Procurement with Type-Dependent Reservation Utility
    by Shane B. Evans

  • 2010 Franchise Contracts with Ex Post Limited Liability
    by Shane B. Evans

  • 2010 Esquemas de Incentivos y Carteras de Inversión Innovadoras
    by Gino Loyola & Yolanda Portilla

  • 2010 Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard
    by Jacques Crémer

  • 2010 Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
    by Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto

  • 2010 Vertical Integration in High-Transaction Cost Sectors: the Case of the Bulgarian Pharmaceutical Industry
    by Tamara TODOROVA

  • 2010 A Theory of Firm Decline
    by Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Soni Di Giannatale

  • 2010 Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design under Moral Hazard
    by Borys Grochulski

  • 2010 Tradeoff between Equity and Effciency in Revenue Sharing Contracts
    by Bogumił Kamiński & Maciej Łatek

  • 2010 Stimulating Mechanisms in Ecologically Motivated Regulation: Will Ecological Policies in Transition and Developing Countries Become Efficient?
    by Matveenko, V.

  • 2010 Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships
    by Björn Bartling & Ferdinand A. von Siemens

  • 2010 Információs paradoxon a vállalkozások hitelezésében nem fizető vevő esetén
    by Csóka, Péter & Havran, Dániel & Szűcs, Nóra

  • 2010 L’autorité ne fait pas le contrat de travail : Une critique du modèle de Simon (1951)
    by Camille Chaserant

  • 2010 Modelo de incentivos para la reducción de pérdidas de energía eléctrica en Colombia
    by Denice Jeanneth Romero-López & Andrés Vargas-Rojas

  • 2010 Whither Contract Damages: Contracts with Bilateral Reliance, One-sided Private Information
    by Sugata Bag

  • 2010 La loi sur le crédit à la consommation : la protection de la clientèle au coeur de la prévention et du contrôle bancaire et assurantiel
    by Sellier, C.

  • 2010 Le dispositif de traitement des situations de surendettement des particuliers : les principaux effets de la loi Lagarde
    by Béguery, M.

  • 2010 Organizing for Synergies
    by Wouter Dessein & Luis Garicano & Robert Gertner

  • 2010 Security Price Informativeness with Delegated Traders
    by Gary Gorton & Ping He & Lixin Huang

  • 2010 The Political Economy of Debt Bondage
    by Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal & Dilip Mookherjee

  • 2010 Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games
    by Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari

  • 2010 The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts
    by David Martimort & Salvatore Piccolo

  • 2010 Computer Mediated Transactions
    by Hal R. Varian

  • 2010 All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment
    by Bo Chen

  • 2010 Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts
    by Sylvain Chassang

  • 2010 Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
    by Henrik Horn & Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger

  • 2010 Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements
    by Josh Lerner & Ulrike Malmendier

  • 2009 Optimal design and p-concavity
    by Christian Ewerhart

  • 2009 Sovereign Debt Default : The Impact of Creditor Composition
    by Dhillon Amrita, & García-Fronti Javier & Zhang Lei

  • 2009 Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital
    by Dessi, Roberta

  • 2009 Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs
    by Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M.

  • 2009 Did Prepayments Sustain the Subprime Market?
    by Bhardwaj, G. & Sengupta, R.

  • 2009 Exclusivity as Inefficient Insurance
    by Argenton, C. & Willems, Bert

  • 2009 Semi-Public Contests
    by Prüfer, J.

  • 2009 Rotten Kids With Bad Intentions
    by Nick Netzer & Armin Schmutzler

  • 2009 Professional Liability Insurance Contracts: Claims Made Versus Occurrence Policies
    by Martin Boyer & Karine Gobert

  • 2009 Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
    by Marco Faravelli & Oliver Kirchkamp & Helmut Rainer

  • 2009 Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B
    by Elisabetta Iossa & Giancarlo Spagnolo

  • 2009 Bait Contracts
    by Marie-Louise Vierø

  • 2009 The (Im)Possibility of Reverse Share Tenancy
    by Bellemare, Marc F.

  • 2009 Borrowing Constraint as an Optimal Contract
    by Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe

  • 2009 Exploration of an agenda for transparency in the construction industry
    by Nijhof, A. & Graafland, J.J. & Kuijer de, O.

  • 2009 "Endogenous" Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers' Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm
    by Ramalingam, Abhijit

  • 2009 Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion
    by Di Maggio, Marco

  • 2009 Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory
    by Jellal, Mohamed

  • 2009 Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure
    by Kou, Zonglai & Zhou, Min

  • 2009 Sequential Innovation and the Duration of Technology Licensing
    by Gordanier, John & Chun-Hui, Miao

  • 2009 Governing of Agro-Ecosystem Services
    by Bachev, Hrabrin

  • 2009 Partnership Dissolution and Proprietary Information
    by Li, Jianpei

  • 2009 Free daily newspapers: too many incentives to print?
    by João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Resende

  • 2009 Do Managers with Limited Liability Take More Risky Decisions? An Information Acquisition Model
    by James Malcomson

  • 2009 Contract Design in Insurance Groups
    by Stefan Dercon & Tessa Bold

  • 2009 The Dynamics of Climate Agreements
    by Bard Harstad

  • 2009 The Economics of Labor Coercion
    by Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky

  • 2009 Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements
    by Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger

  • 2009 Satisficing Contracts
    by Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud

  • 2009 Policy Announcements and Welfare
    by Christian A. Stoltenberg & Vadym Lepetyuk

  • 2009 Incentives and tranche retention in securitisation : a screening model
    by Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell

  • 2009 Structured Finance, Risk Management, and the Recent Financial Crisis
    by Georges Dionne

  • 2009 Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
    by Levent Kockesen & Emanuele Gerratana

  • 2009 Incentives, Identity, and Organizational Forms
    by Kohei Daido

  • 2009 Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
    by Marco Faravelli & Oliver Kirchkamp & Helmut Rainer

  • 2009 Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
    by Dur, Robert & Sol, Joeri

  • 2009 Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
    by Dur, Robert & Sol, Joeri

  • 2009 Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions
    by Wu, Steven Y.

  • 2009 Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions
    by Wu, Steven Y.

  • 2009 Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
    by von Siemens, Ferdinand & Kosfeld, Michael

  • 2009 Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
    by von Siemens, Ferdinand & Kosfeld, Michael

  • 2009 Do the Selfish Mimic Cooperators? Experimental Evidence from Finitely-Repeated Labor Markets
    by Roe, Brian E. & Wu, Steven Y.

  • 2009 Do the Selfish Mimic Cooperators? Experimental Evidence from Finitely-Repeated Labor Markets
    by Roe, Brian E. & Wu, Steven Y.

  • 2009 Commitment to Self-Rewards
    by Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia

  • 2009 Commitment to Self-Rewards
    by Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia

  • 2009 Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns
    by Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht

  • 2009 Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns
    by Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht

  • 2009 Policy announcements and welfare
    by Christian A. Stoltenberg & Vadym Lepetyuk

  • 2009 Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital
    by Dessi, Roberta

  • 2009 The value of public private partnerships in infrastructure
    by Nilsson, Jan-Eric

  • 2009 Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax and Nonlinear Pricing: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Static Properties
    by Simula, Laurent

  • 2009 Starting Small in Free Trade Agreements
    by Harun Onder

  • 2009 Neutral Optima in Informed Principal Problems with Common Values
    by Dieter Balkenborg & Miltiadis Makris

  • 2009 Flexible Contracts
    by Piero Gottardi & Jean Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato

  • 2009 A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Credit Market
    by Kaniska Dam

  • 2009 Why Tax Capital?
    by Yili Chien & Junsang Lee

  • 2009 Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
    by Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Hein Roelfsema

  • 2009 Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements
    by Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger

  • 2009 Two-sided career concern and financial equilibrium
    by Yolanda Portilla

  • 2009 Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2009 Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements
    by Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert

  • 2009 Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: A Screening Model
    by Fender, Ingo & Mitchell, Janet

  • 2009 Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening
    by Calzolari, Giacomo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo

  • 2009 Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital
    by Dessí, Roberta

  • 2009 The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2009 Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2009 A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
    by Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew

  • 2009 Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2009 Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts
    by Juan Manuel Julio Román

  • 2009 Absenteeism In The Italian Public Sector: The Effects Of Changes In Sick Leave Compensation
    by Maria De Paola & Valeria Pupo & Vincenzo Scoppa

  • 2009 Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance
    by Conny Wunsch

  • 2009 Flexible contracts
    by Piero Gottardi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato

  • 2009 Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
    by Matthias Kräkel & Anja Schöttner

  • 2009 Worker Self-Selection and the Profits from Cooperation
    by Michael Kosfeld & Ferdinand A. von Siemens

  • 2009 Gift Exchange in The Workplace: Money or Attention?
    by Robert Dur

  • 2009 Information Sharing in Common Agency: When is Transparency Good?
    by Norbert Maier & Marco Ottaviani

  • 2009 Incentive Compensation, Valuation, and Capital Market Access
    by Helmut Laux & Robert M. Gillenkirch & Matthias M. Schabel

  • 2009 Mergers and CEO Power
    by Felipe Balmaceda

  • 2009 Delegation, Risk, and Project Scope
    by Andreas Roider

  • 2009 Internalization Revisited
    by George Norman

  • 2009 Liquidity, Moral Hazard, and Interbank Market Collapse
    by Enisse Kharroubi & Edouard Vidon

  • 2009 Contracting with Third Parties
    by Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström

  • 2009 Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting
    by Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen

  • 2009 Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
    by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier

  • 2009 Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
    by Susanne Ohlendorf

  • 2009 Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
    by Jean Tirole

  • 2008 How We Might Model a Credit Squeeze, and Draw Some Policy Implications for Responding to It
    by Sinclair, Peter J. N.

  • 2008 Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
    by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2008 Governance und Vertragsstrukturen in der deutschen VC Industrie: Eine empirische Einschätzung
    by Bienz, Carsten & Hirsch, Julia & Walz, Uwe

  • 2008 Sequential Innovations and Intellectual Property Rights
    by Payot, Frederic & Szalay, Dezsö

  • 2008 Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization
    by Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto

  • 2008 Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information
    by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2008 Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja

  • 2008 Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors
    by Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver

  • 2008 Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
    by Budde, Jörg & Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2008 Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
    by Ohlendorf, Susanne

  • 2008 On the Effects of the Degree of Discretion in Reporting Managerial performance
    by De Waegenaere, A.M.B. & Wielhouwer, J.L.

  • 2008 Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition
    by Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons

  • 2008 Bonuses, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crunch
    by Peter Sinclair & Guy Spier & Tom Skinner

  • 2008 A Theory of Firm Decline
    by Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley & Sonia Di Giannatale

  • 2008 Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods
    by Deb, Rahul

  • 2008 A model of delegated project choice
    by Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John

  • 2008 Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior
    by Sadowski, Philipp

  • 2008 Information projection: model and applications
    by Madarasz, Kristof

  • 2008 From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions
    by Vahabi, Mehrdad

  • 2008 Organization of Innovation and Capital Markets
    by Orman, Cuneyt

  • 2008 Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt
    by Ong, David

  • 2008 Uberrimae Fidei and Adverse Selection: the equitable legal judgment of Insurance Contracts
    by Strauss, Jason David

  • 2008 Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims
    by Harold L. Cole

  • 2008 Implications of Endogenous Group Formation for Efficient Risk-Sharing
    by Tessa Bold

  • 2008 Making Property Productive: Reorganizing Rights to Real and Equitable Estates in Britain, 1660 to 1830
    by Dan Bogart & Gary Richardson

  • 2008 On the Role and Design of Dispute Settlement Procedures in International Trade Agreements
    by Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger

  • 2008 The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada
    by David A. Jaeger & Esteban F. Klor & Sami H. Miaari & M. Daniele Paserman

  • 2008 Persistent Private Information
    by Noah Williams

  • 2008 Workers behavior and labor contract : an evolutionary approach
    by Victor Hiller

  • 2008 Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement
    by Peter Bardsley & Ingrid Burfurd

  • 2008 Auctioning Public Office
    by Costas Roumanias

  • 2008 Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen
    by Scholz, Julia

  • 2008 Differences in Social Preferences - Are They Profitable for the Firm?
    by Küpper, Hans-Ulrich & Sandner, Kai

  • 2008 Balancing Performance Measures When Agents Behave Competitively in an Environment With Technological Interdependencies
    by Sandner, Kai

  • 2008 How Ego-threats Facilitate Contracts Based on Subjective Evaluations
    by Alexander Sebald & Markus Walzl

  • 2008 Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts
    by Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti

  • 2008 Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts
    by Levent Koçkesen & Emanuele Gerratana

  • 2008 Breakup of Repeat Transaction Contracts, Specific Investment, and Efficient Rent-Seeking
    by Bernhard Ganglmair

  • 2008 Worker Self-Selection and the Profits from Cooperation
    by Kosfeld, Michael & von Siemens, Ferdinand

  • 2008 Worker Self-Selection and the Profits from Cooperation
    by Kosfeld, Michael & von Siemens, Ferdinand

  • 2008 Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
    by Dur, Robert

  • 2008 Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
    by Dur, Robert

  • 2008 Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja

  • 2008 Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja

  • 2008 Principal-Agent Theory and Nonprofit Accountability
    by Richard Steinberg

  • 2008 Firms, Markets, and the Work Ethic
    by Abhijit Ramalingam & Michael Rauh

  • 2008 Optimal Grading
    by Robertas Zubrickas

  • 2008 Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
    by Tirole, Jean

  • 2008 Does physicians' compensation affect the probability of their vetoing generic substitution?
    by Granlund, David

  • 2008 Does Physicians' Compensation Affect the Probability of their Vetoing Generic Substitution?
    by Granlund, David

  • 2008 Job Security as an Endogenous Job Characteristic
    by Jahn, Elke J. & Wagner, Thomas

  • 2008 Organizational Design and Control across Multiple Markets: The Case of Franchising in the Convenience Store Industry
    by Dennis Campbell & Srikant M. Datar & Tatiana Sandino

  • 2008 Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services
    by Gian Luigi Albano & Federico Dini & Roberto Zampino

  • 2008 Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?
    by Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi

  • 2008 Merger Control with Transfers from the Capital Gains Tax
    by Arnaud Féral

  • 2008 Dynamic Contract Breach
    by Fan Zhang

  • 2008 A Note on the Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
    by Ching-jen Sun

  • 2008 Assurance santé et sélection adverse : L’incidence des maladies invalidantes
    by Alary, David & Bien, Franck

  • 2008 Moral Hazard: Messages, Delegation and Efficiency
    by Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan

  • 2008 Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks
    by Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2008 Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2008 Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation
    by Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2008 Innovación e incumbent failure: Una ilustración usando la industria de las telecomunicaciones en Colombia
    by Hernán Herrera Echeverry

  • 2008 Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
    by Robert Dur

  • 2008 Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
    by Robert Dur & Joeri Sol

  • 2008 Overconfidence in a Career-Concerns Setting
    by Leonidas Enrique De La Rosa

  • 2008 Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also Forget?
    by Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi

  • 2008 Inovação e seu financiamento: as contribuições da nova economia institucional
    by Márcia Siqueira Rapini

  • 2008 Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
    by Jörg Budde & Matthias Kräkel

  • 2008 Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments
    by Matthias Kräkel

  • 2008 How We Might Model a Credit Squeeze, and Draw some Policy Implications for Responding to it
    by Peter Sinclair

  • 2008 Bonuses, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crunch
    by Peter Sinclair & Guy Spier & Tom Skinner

  • 2008 Liquidity, Moral Hazard and Inter-Bank Market Collapse
    by Kharroubi, E. & Vidon E.

  • 2008 Too Few Cooks Spoil the Broth: Division of Labour and Directed Production
    by Marisa Ratto & Wendelin Schnedler

  • 2008 Why Tax Capital?
    by Junsang Lee & Yili Chien

  • 2008 Competing for Ownership
    by Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman

  • 2008 Consumer optimism and price discrimination
    by Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran

  • 2008 Discussion of "Distorted Performance Measurement And Relational Contracts"
    by Christian Riegler

  • 2008 Distorted Performance Measurement And Relational Contracts
    by Jörg Budde

  • 2008 Vague Terms: Contracting when Precision in Terms is Infeasible
    by Benjamin E. Hermalin

  • 2008 Contractual Enforcement Institutions and the Structure of Information
    by Avery W. Katz

  • 2008 Factores determinantes del tamaño del Sector no Lucrativo en las Comunidades Autónomas españolas/Determinant factors for the Size of the Nonprofit Sector in the Spanish regions
    by CALDERON MILLÁN, BEATRIZ

  • 2008 All-or-Nothing Monitoring
    by Rui R. Zhao

  • 2008 Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Social Norms
    by Paul Fischer & Steven Huddart

  • 2008 Contracts, Hold-Up, and Exports: Textiles and Opium in Colonial India
    by Rachel Kranton & Anand V. Swamy

  • 2008 Matching with Contracts: Comment
    by John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima

  • 2007 Large Risks, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard
    by Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane

  • 2007 Solutions Manual to Accompany Contract Theory
    by Arthur Campbell & Moshe Cohen & Florian Ederer & Johannes Spinnewijn

  • 2007 Relative Performance in Bilateral Trade
    by Christian Ewerhart

  • 2007 Transaction Cost Economics: An Introduction
    by Williamson, Oliver E.

  • 2007 Optimal hierarchies with diverse decision-makers
    by Puschke, Kerstin

  • 2007 Financing Multi-stage projects under moral hazard and limited commitment
    by Josepa Miquel-Florensa

  • 2007 Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must we Also Forget?
    by Piero Gottardi & Ronel Elul

  • 2007 Power
    by Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis

  • 2007 Relative Performance Evaluation, Risk Aversion and Entry
    by Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Gwenaël Piase

  • 2007 Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships
    by Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von

  • 2007 Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation
    by Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias

  • 2007 Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition
    by Xianwen Shi

  • 2007 The Impact of Switching Costs on Vendor Financing
    by Martin Boyer & Karine Gobert

  • 2007 Learning by Doing vs. Learning from Others in a Principal-Agent Model
    by Jasmina Arifovic & Alexander Karaivanov

  • 2007 A Note on the Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
    by Sun, Ching-jen

  • 2007 Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
    by Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E.

  • 2007 Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion
    by Thiele, Veikko

  • 2007 Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina
    by Schmid, Andreas

  • 2007 Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships
    by Athias, Laure

  • 2007 Contracting with a quiet life manager
    by Eduard Alonso-Paulí

  • 2007 Games in Coalitional Form
    by Ehud Kalai

  • 2007 Stock Options and Chief Executive Compensation
    by Christopher Armstrong & David Larcker & Che-Lin Su

  • 2007 Arbitration, Mediation and Cheap Talk
    by Maria Goltsman & Johannes Horner & Gregory Pavlov & Francesco Squintani

  • 2007 Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency
    by Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet

  • 2007 Signalling with Career Concerns
    by Kim-Sau Chung & Peter Eso

  • 2007 Tournaments with Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents
    by Theofanis Tsoulouhas & Kosmas Marinakis

  • 2007 Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk
    by Thomas Philippon & Yuliy Sannikov

  • 2007 Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points
    by Oliver Hart

  • 2007 Reference Points and the Theory of the Firm
    by Oliver D. Hart

  • 2007 A Reconsideration of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance
    by Martin Hellwig

  • 2007 Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships
    by Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von

  • 2007 Games with Externalities and Delegation to a Common Agent
    by Emanuele Gerratana

  • 2007 The Pygmalion and Galatea Effects: An Agency Model with Reference-Dependent Preferences and Applications to Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
    by Kohei Daido & Hideshi Itoh

  • 2007 Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control
    by Guido Friebel & Wendelin Schnedler

  • 2007 Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control
    by Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2007 Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope
    by Roider, Andreas

  • 2007 Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope
    by Andreas Roider

  • 2007 On the Optimality of a Minimum Wage: New Insights from Optimal Tax Theory
    by Hungerbühler, Mathias & Lehmann, Etienne

  • 2007 On the Optimality of a Minimum Wage: New Insights from Optimal Tax Theory
    by Etienne Lehmann & Mathias Hungerbühler

  • 2007 Discretionary Latitude and Relational Contracting
    by Wu, Steven Y. & Roe, Brian E.

  • 2007 Discretionary Latitude and Relational Contracting
    by Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe

  • 2007 Incentives, Solidarity, and the Division of Labor
    by Michael T. Rauh

  • 2007 Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency: A non-contingent approach
    by Manuel Willington & Roy Costilla

  • 2007 Team Governance: Empowerment of Hierarchical Control
    by Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2007 Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay
    by Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele

  • 2007 Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis
    by Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe

  • 2007 Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
    by Horn, Henrik & Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Rikard W.

  • 2007 The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement
    by Arun Malik

  • 2007 Microfinance, Subsidies and Dynamic Incentives
    by Suman Ghosh & Eric Van Tassel

  • 2007 Testing for information asymmetries in voluntary conservation contracts
    by Ricardo Smith Ramírez

  • 2007 Exclusionary contracts, entry, and communication
    by Gerlach, Heiko

  • 2007 Autorité et flexibilité : quand la théorie des options interroge
    by Camille Chaserant

  • 2007 Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders
    by Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella

  • 2007 Relative Performance Evaluation, Risk Aversion and Entry
    by Jean-Daniel Guigou & Bruno Lovat & Gwenaël Piaser

  • 2007 Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control
    by Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin

  • 2007 Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2007 Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard
    by Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2007 Protocol Design and (De-)Centralization
    by Grüner, Hans Peter

  • 2007 Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information
    by Schmitz, Patrick W

  • 2007 Delegation and Incentives
    by Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel

  • 2007 Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
    by Horn, Henrik & Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert

  • 2007 Lanzamiento de nuevas marcas en industrias de productos homogéneos básicos con altos niveles de concentración
    by Hernán Herrera Echeverry

  • 2007 Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
    by Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema

  • 2007 An Economic Theory of the Glass Ceiling
    by Paul A. Grout & In-Uck Park & Silvia Sonderegger

  • 2007 Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets
    by Paul A.Grout & Ian Jewitt & Silvia Sonderegger

  • 2007 Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation
    by Oliver Gürtler & Matthias Kräkel

  • 2007 Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information
    by Jihong Lee

  • 2007 Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control
    by Guido Friebel & Wendelin Schnedler

  • 2007 Contracts and uncertainty
    by Sandroni, Alvaro & Olszewski, Wojciech

  • 2007 Institutional View of Accounting
    by David Procházka

  • 2007 The Allocation of Authority in a Joint Project under Limited Liability
    by Kerstin Puschke

  • 2007 Nach dem EU-Gipfel in Brüssel: Wie sieht die Zukunft Europas aus?
    by Werner Weidenfeld & Wolfgang Wessels & Verena Schäfer & Andreas Maurer

  • 2007 Theft, Gift-Giving, and Trustworthiness: Honesty Is Its Own Reward in Rural Paraguay
    by Laura Schechter

  • 2006 Contracting with Self-Esteem Concerns
    by Junichiro Ishida

  • 2006 A Note on Walrasian Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Aggregate Uncertainty
    by Piero Gottardi & Belén Jerez

  • 2006 Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk

  • 2006 Why football players may benefit from the "shadow of the transfer system"
    by Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang

  • 2006 Contracting in Vague Environments
    by Marie-Louise Vierø

  • 2006 Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2006 Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 A Principal-Agent Model for Evaluating the Economic Value of a Beef Traceability System: A Case Study with Injection-site Lesions Control in Fed Cattle
    by Resende-Filho, Moises & Buhr, Brian

  • 2006 Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study
    by Wu, Steven & Roe, Brian & Sporleder, Thomas

  • 2006 Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game
    by Jurdziak, Leszek

  • 2006 Mechanism Design for Biodiversity Conservation in Developing Countries
    by Luca Di Corato

  • 2006 Contracting with Self-Esteem Concerns
    by Junichiro Ishida

  • 2006 Contracts as Reference Points
    by Oliver Hart & John Moore

  • 2006 Contractual Tradeoffs and SMEs Choice of Organizational Form, A View from U.S. and French History, 1830-2000
    by Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal

  • 2006 Judicial Risk and Credit Market Performance: Micro Evidence from Brazilian Payroll Loans
    by Ana Carla A. Costa & Joao M.P. De Mello

  • 2006 Incentive Problems with Unidimensional Hidden Characteristics: A Unified Approach
    by Martin Hellwig

  • 2006 Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information
    by Martimort, D. & Poudou, J.-C. & Sand-Zantman, W.

  • 2006 Private participation in the provision of water in Antioquia (Colombia)
    by David Tobón Orozco

  • 2006 Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
    by Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka

  • 2006 Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
    by Kräkel, Matthias & Sliwka, Dirk

  • 2006 Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
    by W. Bentley MacLeod

  • 2006 Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
    by MacLeod, W. Bentley

  • 2006 Why football players may benefit from the "shadow of the transfer system"
    by Helmut Dietl & Egon Franck & Markus Lang

  • 2006 Dynamic Contracting for Development Aid Projects. Mechanism Design and High Performance Computation
    by Rashid, Salim & Shorish, Jamsheed & Sobh, Nahil

  • 2006 Multitasking, limited liability and political agency
    by John William Hatfield & Gerard Padro i Miquel

  • 2006 Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis
    by Carsten Bienz & Uwe Walz

  • 2006 The Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard: The Ex Ante Contracting Case
    by Randy Silvers

  • 2006 Borders, Endogenous Market Access and Growth
    by Tomasz Michalski

  • 2006 Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets
    by Grout, Paul A & Jewitt, Ian & Sonderegger, Silvia

  • 2006 CEO Compensation and Strategy Inertia
    by Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M

  • 2006 Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? -- On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
    by Matthias Kräkel & Dirk Sliwka

  • 2006 Grupos de interés y regulación ambiental en Colombia: el caso de los recursos hídricos
    by Medardo Restrepo Patiño

  • 2006 Grupos de interés y regulación ambiental en Colombia: el caso de los recursos hídricos
    by Restrepo, Medardo

  • 2005 The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition
    by Bernard Salanié

  • 2005 Contract Theory
    by Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont

  • 2005 Moral Hazard Severity and Contract Design
    by Ronald A. Dye & Sri S. Sridhar

  • 2005 The dynamics of venture capital contracts
    by Bienz, Carsten & Hirsch, Julia

  • 2005 Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer
    by Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick

  • 2005 Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal Market
    by Smits, Jan

  • 2005 Incentivos en selección adversa para el control del acceso a espacios naturales protegidos
    by Fuentes Castro, Daniel

  • 2005 Rent Seeking and Judicial Bias in Weak Legal Systems
    by Peter Bardsley & Quan Nguyen

  • 2005 The dynamics of venture capital contracts
    by Carsten Bienz & Julia Hirsch

  • 2005 Long-term debt and hidden borrowing
    by Heski Bar-Isaac & Alejandro Cuñat

  • 2005 Loyalty and competence: Empirical evidence from public agencies
    by Alexander F. Wagner

  • 2004 Risk Aversion and Income Tax Enforcement
    by Parkash Chander

  • 2004-02 О Возможности Нарушения Договоренностей
    by Harin, Alexander

  • 2003 Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2003 The Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations under Risk Aversion
    by Yurday, Zeynep

  • 2002 Contracts in Trade and Transition: The Resurgence of Barter
    by Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer

  • 2002 Nonparametric Adverse Selection Problems
    by Carlier, Guillaume

  • 2002 Rugalmas nyugdíjkorhatár és optimális lineáris járulék- és járadékfüggvény
    by Simonovits, András

  • 2000 Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999)
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 2000 Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 1998 Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs
    by Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo

  • 1998 On Randomization in Coalition Contracts
    by Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 1997 From Cronies to Professionals: The Evolution of Family Firms
    by Bhattacharya, Utpal & Ravikumar, B

  • 1996 Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge
    by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W.

  • 1996 Nonlinear pricing with imperfectly informed consumers
    by Armstrong, Mark

  • 1993 L'économie des contrats : technologies de l'information et coordination interentreprises
    by Brousseau, Eric

  • 1991 Trafficking in drugs and economic theory
    by Pandey, S.S.D.

  • 1988 Seniority and Distribution in a Two-Worker Trade Union
    by Peter Kuhn & Jacques Robert

  • Forthcoming Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
    by Ulbricht, Robert

  • Forthcoming Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
    by Burkett, Justin

  • Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection
    by Theodoros M. Diasakos & Kostas Koufopoulos

  • Bonuses, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crunch
    by Peter Sinclair & Guy Spier & Tom Skinner

  • Pareto Optimal Allocations for Probabilistic Sophisticated Variational Preferences
    by Claudia RAVANELLI & Gregor SVINDLAND

  • Merger Performance and Managerial Incentives
    by Matthias Kräkel and Daniel Müller

  • This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.