Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno Biais & Hans Gersbach & Jean-Charles Rochet & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2024. "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_412v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Bruno Biais & Hans Gersbach & Jean-Charles Rochet & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2024. "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," Working Papers hal-04759186, HAL.
- Biais, Bruno & Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2024. "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," HEC Research Papers Series 1516, HEC Paris.
- Villeneuve, Stéphane & Biais, Bruno & Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2024. "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," TSE Working Papers 24-1511, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
References listed on IDEAS
- Zhigu He & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2012.
"A Model of Capital and Crises,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 735-777.
- Zhiguo He & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2008. "A Model of Capital and Crises," NBER Working Papers 14366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Arvind Krishnamurthy & Zhiguo He, 2009. "A Model of Capital and Crises," 2009 Meeting Papers 85, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007.
"Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 345-390.
- Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas & Plantin, Guillaume & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2004. "Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications," IDEI Working Papers 312, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2006.
- Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007. "Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications," Post-Print hal-03415915, HAL.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005.
"A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2002. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Working Papers (Old Series) 0211, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Rocheteau, Guillaume & Weill, Pierre-Olivier & Wong, Tsz-Nga, 2021.
"An heterogeneous-agent New-Monetarist model with an application to unemployment,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 64-90.
- Guillaume Rocheteau & Pierre-Olivier Weill & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2018. "An Heterogeneous-Agent New-Monetarist Model with an Application to Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 25220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Jean-Charles Rochet & StÈphane Villeneuve, 2010.
"Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 73-118, January.
- Biais, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2007. "Large Risks, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 472, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2009.
- Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Jean-Charles Rochet & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2010. "Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard," Post-Print halshs-00491470, HAL.
- Yves Achdou & Jiequn Han & Jean-Michel Lasry & Pierre-Louis Lionse & Benjamin Moll, 2022. "Income and Wealth Distribution in Macroeconomics: A Continuous-Time Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(1), pages 45-86.
- Sebastian Di Tella & Yuliy Sannikov, 2021. "Optimal Asset Management Contracts With Hidden Savings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1099-1139, May.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987.
"Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
- Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978.
"A model of social insurance with variable retirement,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
- P. A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1977. "A Model of Social Insurance With Variable Retirement," Working papers 210, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Achdou, Yves & Han, Jiequn & Lasry, Jean Michel & Lions, Pierre Louis & Moll, Ben, 2022. "Income and wealth distribution in macroeconomics: a continuous-time approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- PETER M. DeMARZO & YULIY SANNIKOV, 2006. "Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2681-2724, December.
- Merton, Robert C, 1969. "Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 51(3), pages 247-257, August.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
- Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2011.
"Tractability in Incentive Contracting,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(9), pages 2865-2894.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 7578, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," NBER Working Papers 15545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2010. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," Working Papers 10-13, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
- Xavier Gabaix & Alex Edmans, 2010. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," 2010 Meeting Papers 1120, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2012.
"Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 268-306.
- Alex Gershkov & Motty Perry, 2011. "Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Working Papers 001-11, International School of Economics at TSU, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.
- Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016.
"Robust Contracts in Continuous Time,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
- Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84(4), pages 1405-1440, July.
- Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2013. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-009, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2019.
"Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(3), pages 1363-1429, June.
- Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2015. "Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 20979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023.
"Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
- Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2021. "Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting," Working Papers 2021-58, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016.
"Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets,"
Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 725-841,
Elsevier.
- Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2016. "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 22012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013.
"Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
- Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," KIER Working Papers 863, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Maideu-Morera, Gerard, 2024. "Firm Size and Compensation Dynamics with Risk Aversion and Persistent Private Information," TSE Working Papers 24-1535, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2016. "Liquidity and Risk Management: Coordinating Investment and Compensation Policies," 2016 Meeting Papers 1703, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Working Papers hal-03783062, HAL.
- Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Morellec, Erwan & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Mayer, Simon, 2018. "Agency Conflicts over the Short and Long Run: Short-termism, Long-termism, and Pay-for-Luck," CEPR Discussion Papers 12720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Villeneuve, Stéphane & Abi Jaber, Eduardo, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," TSE Working Papers 22-1363, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
- Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Post-Print hal-03783062, HAL.
- Eduardo Abi Jaber & St'ephane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Papers 2209.10878, arXiv.org.
- Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2025-06-09 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2025-06-09 (Economic Design)
- NEP-DGE-2025-06-09 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MIC-2025-06-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2025-06-09 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:130553. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tsetofr.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.