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Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital

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  • Patrick Bolton
  • Neng Wang
  • Jinqiang Yang

Abstract

A risk-averse entrepreneur with access to a profitable venture needs to raise funds from investors. She cannot indefinitely commit her human capital to the venture, which limits the firm’s debt capacity, distorts investment and compensation, and constrains the entrepreneur’s risk-sharing. This puts dynamic liquidity and state-contingent risk allocation at the center of corporate financial management. The firm balances mean-variance investment efficiency and the preservation of financial slack. We show that in general the entrepreneur’s net worth is overexposed to idiosyncratic risk and underexposed to systematic risk. These distortions are greater the closer the firm is to exhausting its debt capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Bolton & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2015. "Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital," NBER Working Papers 20979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20979
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    Cited by:

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    7. Liang, H. & Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2017. "Corporate Employee-Engagement and Merger Outcomes," Other publications TiSEM ab3f7a1d-a202-48b7-9c75-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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