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A Theory of Wage Dynamics

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  • Milton Harris
  • Bengt Holmstrom

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  • Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Discussion Papers 488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:488
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/488.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith Freeman, 1977. "Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 419-443, Autumn.
    2. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1981. "Contractual Models of the Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 308-313, May.
    5. Prescott, Edward C & Visscher, Michael, 1980. "Organization Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 446-461, June.
    6. Martin Neil Baily, 1974. "Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 37-50.
    7. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    8. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
    9. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 572-586, Autumn.
    10. Grossman, Herschel I, 1977. " Risk Shifting and Reliability in Labor Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(2), pages 187-209.
    11. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-375, July.
    2. Barrett, Christopher B. & Bailey, DeeVon, 1999. "Are Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries Competitively Or Monopsonistically Determined?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 28(1), April.
    3. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence F. Katz & Thomas Lemieux & Daniel Parent, 2005. "Comparative Advantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 681-724, October.
    4. Charles T. Carlstrom, 1989. "Turnover, wages, and adverse selection," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 18-28.
    5. David N. Margolis, 1996. "Cohort Effects and Returns to Seniority in France," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 41-42, pages 443-464.
    6. Plasman, Robert & Rycx, Francois & Tojerow, Ilan, 2006. "Industry Wage Differentials, Unobserved Ability, and Rent-Sharing: Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data, 1995-2002," IZA Discussion Papers 2387, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Blackburn, McKinley L & Neumark, David, 1993. "Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase in the Return to Schooling," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 11(3), pages 521-544, July.
    8. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-250, April.
    9. Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, August.
    10. Cetorelli, Nicola & Peretto, Pietro F., 2000. "Oligopoly Banking and Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 00-19, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    11. Bengt Holmstrom & I. Ricard & Joan Costa, 1984. "Managerial Incentives and Capital Management," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 729, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    12. Marianne Bertrand, 2004. "From the Invisible Handshake to the Invisible Hand? How Import Competition Changes the Employment Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(4), pages 723-766, October.
    13. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
    14. Joan E. Ricarti Costa, 1984. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Discussion Papers 595S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    15. Espen Eckbo, B. & Thorburn, Karin S., 2003. "Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 227-258, July.
    16. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Lustig, Hanno & Syverson, Chad & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2011. "Technological change and the growing inequality in managerial compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 601-627, March.
    19. Miguel Portela & Ana Rute Cardoso, 2005. "The provision of wage insurance by the firm: evidence from a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset," NIPE Working Papers 17/2005, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    20. Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Information on worker ability : An analysis of investment within the firm," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 57-80.
    21. David Neumark, 1992. "Are Rising Wage Profiles a Forced-Saving Mechanism?," NBER Working Papers 4213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Tomas Philipson & George Zanjani, 1997. "Consumption vs. Production of Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    24. Joseph G. Altonji & Nicolas Williams, 1992. "The Effects of Labor Market Experience, Job Seniority, and Job Mobility on Wage Growth," NBER Working Papers 4133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Why Bad Wokers Receive Raises," UCLA Economics Working Papers 301, UCLA Department of Economics.

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