Contractual Models of the Labor Market
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- Bengt Holmstrom, 1980. "Contractural Models of the Labor Market," Discussion Papers 442, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Citations
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Cited by:
- David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, 1999.
"Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1081-1110, October.
- David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, 1997. "Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 6088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gutierrez, Federico H., 2014. "Acute morbidity and labor outcomes in Mexico: Testing the role of labor contracts as an income smoothing mechanism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 1-12.
- Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"A Theory of Wage Dynamics,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(3), pages 315-333.
- Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Discussion Papers 488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Schöttner, Anja, 2005. "Relational contracts and job design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2005-052, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Alan Benson & Aaron Sojourner & Akhmed Umyarov, 2020.
"Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1802-1825, May.
- Benson, Alan & Sojourner, Aaron & Umyarov, Akhmed, 2015. "Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 9501, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Alan Benson & Aaron Sojourner & Akhmed Umyarov, 2018. "Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market," Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers 16, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Alan Benson & Aaron Sojourner & Akhmed Umyarov, 2018. "Can reputation discipline the gig economy? Experimental evidence from an online labor market," Working Papers 2018-066, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2005-052 is not listed on IDEAS
- Joan E. Ricarti Costa, 1984. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Discussion Papers 595S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2291-2372 is not listed on IDEAS
- Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017.
"Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
- Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2016. "Repeated Lobbying by Commercial Lobbyists and Special Interests," CESifo Working Paper Series 5809, CESifo.
- David Neumark, 2003.
"Age Discrimination Legislation in the United States,"
Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 21(3), pages 297-317, July.
- David Neumark, 2001. "Age Discrimination Legislation in the United States," NBER Working Papers 8152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kátay, Gábor, 2008.
"Do firms provide wage insurance against shocks? Evidence from Hungary,"
Working Paper Series
964, European Central Bank.
- Gábor Kátay, 2008. "Do Firms ProvideWage Insurance Against Shocks? – Evidence from Hungary," MNB Working Papers 2008/8, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
- Miguel Portela & Ana Rute Cardoso, 2005.
"The provision of wage insurance by the firm: evidence from a longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset,"
NIPE Working Papers
17/2005, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Cardoso, Ana Rute & Portela, Miguel, 2005. "The Provision of Wage Insurance by the Firm: Evidence from a Longitudinal Matched Employer-Employee Dataset," IZA Discussion Papers 1865, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Ana Rute Cardoso & Miguel Portela, 2009. "Micro Foundations for Wage Flexibility: Wage Insurance at the Firm Level," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 29-50, March.
- Wulf, Julie, 2009. "Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 305-321, October.
- Kragl, Jenny & Schmid, Julia, 2009.
"The impact of envy on relational employment contracts,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 766-779, November.
- Jenny Kragl & Julia Schmid, 2009. "The Impact of Envy on Relational Employment Contracts," Post-Print hal-00723632, HAL.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1983.
"Unemployment and insurance,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 5-49, January.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1983. "Unemployment and Insurance," NBER Working Papers 1095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Joel Shapiro, 2004.
"Downsizing, job insecurity and firm reputation,"
Economics Working Papers
795, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Doh-Shin Jeon & Joel Shapiro, 2015. "Downsizing, Job Insecurity, and Firm Reputation," Working Papers 144, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Huang, Pinghsun & Huang, Hsin-Yi & Zhang, Yan, 2019. "Do firms hedge with foreign currency derivatives for employees?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 418-440.
- Robert H. Topel & Finis Welch, 1986.
"Efficient Labor Contracts with Employment Risk,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 490-507, Winter.
- Robert H. Topel & Finis Welch, 1986. "Efficient Labor Contracts with Employmeny Risk," UCLA Economics Working Papers 399, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Michael Waldman, 1984.
"Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
- Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics.
- repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-085 is not listed on IDEAS
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