Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ioana Marinescu & Nadav Klein & Andrew Chamberlain & Morgan Smart, 2018.
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More about this item
Keywordslabor; personnel; contracts; online labor markets; job search; screening; reputation; online ratings;
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2015-12-01 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2015-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2015-12-01 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2015-12-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-ICT-2015-12-01 (Information & Communication Technologies)
- NEP-LMA-2015-12-01 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
- NEP-MKT-2015-12-01 (Marketing)
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