Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis
This paper tests several predictions from the literature on firm reputation, and confirms a main result: poor performance leads a firm to conceal its reputation. A residential plumbing firm with a record of complaints one standard deviation above the mean is 133.2 percent more likely to change its name. In addition, firms with longer track records are less likely to change their names or exit, while firms with more firm-specific investments, such as advertising, are more likely to change their names than exit. In addition, firms in small markets value their reputations comparatively more than firms in large markets. (JEL L14, L25, L84)
Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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