Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine
This article studies the effect of the possibility that firms change their names over their incentives for choosing high quality. A firm may want to start over under a new name in order to avoid market punishment, if the reputation carried by its former name is too low. We find that that the effect of the name-changing option on incentives is ambiguous. Although the ability of avoiding punishment generally hurts incentives, it may sometimes improve them. Moreover, doing so may be the only way out a low-effort trap. The conditions under which each case obtains are explored.
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- Steven Tadelis, 1999.
"What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 548-563, June.
- Steve Tadelis, 1997. "What's in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset," Working Papers 97033, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2011. "Sustainable reputations with rating systems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 479-503, March.
- Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251.
- Ryan C. McDevitt, 2011. "Names and Reputations: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 193-209, August.
- Vial Bernardita, 2010. "Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-44, May.
- Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 436, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato, 2006. "Price, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 983-1005, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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