Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.� In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date.� Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world.� We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the history that would be available and how it might be used.� This new approach can explain cycles in reputations.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2011|
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- Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002.
"Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003.
- Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000060, David K. Levine.
- Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations," Working papers 17, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2009. "Limited Records and Reputation," Research Papers 2030, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Tadelis, Steven, 2008. "Seller Reputation," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 273-351, August.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2011.
"Sustainable reputations with rating systems,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 479-503, March.
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